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IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENCES 
UP
According  to its recently released report, Statistics 
Canada says over 90,000  impaired driving  incidents 
were reported by Canadian police in 2011, 
about 3,000 more than the previous year. That’s 2% 
higher than in 2010 and represents the fourth 
increase in the last five years. British Columbia had 
the most incidents of impaired driving  followed by 
Ontario, Alberta and Quebec, while Nunavut had 
the least. 
In 2010/2011 there were just over 48,000 cases 
completed in Canadian Courts where impaired 
driving  was the most serious offence. This was 12% 
of all adult cases, the highest proportion of any 
offence. During  this same period, 84% of impaired 
driving  cases resulted in a guilty finding. This was 
20% higher than the 64% finding  of guilt in 
completed criminal cases generally. 
Fewer convicted impaired drivers went to jail, 
however. About 8% of guilty impaired drivers were 
sentenced to custody. This is down from 14% a 
decade earlier. The average jail sentence for impaired 
driving  was 33 days. In Prince Edward Island, 93% of 
adult impaired drivers were sentenced to custody but 
the median sentence was the lowest in the country at 
five days (except for Nunavut where no-one was 
given a jail sentence). Those convicted in Quebec 
were given the longest median sentence of 60 days. 
TEN EIGHT TURNS THIRTEEN
“In Service: 10-8” is now into its 13th year of publication. It started in 2001 and has become a popular 
read among Canada’s law enforcement community, with readers in all of Canada’s provinces and 
territories. With over thirteen hundred email subscribers, many of which share the newsletter with others 
in their organizations, we are also proud to say that it is read in countries that extend beyond Canada’s 
borders. In Service has readers in the United States, Japan, Uganda, Kenya and Haiti!
GRADUATE CERTIFICATE IN 
PUBLIC SAFETY LEADERSHIP
The JIBC is offering a 15 credit academic program delivered 
entirely online designed to prepare public safety professionals for 
leadership roles in public safety and its related disciplines. 
See page 35
Police Reported Impaired Driving Incidents
Area Number Rate change 
2001 > 2011
% sentenced 
to custody
Median 
sentence length
BC 18,835 +49% 4% 30 days
ON 17,326 -28% 6% 30 days
AB 17,001 +4% 7% 30 days
QU 16,820 -18% 11% 60 days
SK 7,229 +2% 13% 34 days
MB 4,031 +7% 5% data unavailable
NS 3,097 +16% 7% 30 days
NB 2,233 -9% 8% 30 days
NF 1,849 +69% 19% 30 days
PEI 719 +23% 93% 5 days
NWT 639 +58% 16% 30 days
YK 327 +1% 17% 45 days
NU 171 +16% 0% -
Total 90,277 +2% 8% 33 days
Source: Statistics Canada, “Impaired driving in Canada, 2011”, 
catalogue no. 85-002-X, released January 10, 2013.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution subscribe at: 
www.10-8.ca  
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Coming  soon!! ! The Br i t i sh 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia 
Police Academy are hosting  the 
Police Leadership 2013 Conference 
in Vancouver, British Columbia. 
This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference and will provide an opportunity for 
delegates to discuss leadership topics presented 
by world renowned speakers.
“The Service of Policing: 
Meeting Public Expectations”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
www.jibc.ca
see pages 36-37
see 
page   
44
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Alone together: why we expect more from 
technology and less from each other.
Sherry Turkle.
New York, NY: Basic Books, c2011.
HM 851 T86 2011
Beyond learning  by doing: theoretical  currents in 
experiential education.
Jay W. Roberts.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
LB 1027.23 R63 2012
Brain  rules:  12 principles for surviving  and 
thriving at work, home, and school.
John Medina.
Seattle, WA: Pear Press, 2009, c2008.
QP 376 M43 2009
Conflict 101: a manager's guide to resolving 
problems so everyone can get back to work.
Susan H. Shearouse.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
c2011.
HD 42 S54 2011 
Continuing  education in BC's public post-
secondary institutions.
Bob Cowin.
[New Westminster, BC: B. Cowin, 2010.
Presents a summary of key dates and changes in 
continuing  education in BC from 1900 to 2010, with 
a particular focus on post-secondary institutions.
LA 418 B7 C693 2010
Critical thinking, thoughtful  writing: a rhetoric 
with readings.
John Chaffee, Christine McMahon, Barbara Stout.
Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, c2012.
PE 1408 C395 2012
First Nations 101.
Lynda Gray.
Vancouver, BC: Adaawx Publishing, 2011.
E 78 C2 G724 2011
How to talk so people listen: connecting  in 
today's workplace.
Sonya Hamlin.
New York, NY: Collins, c2006.
HF 5718 H284 2006
The mobile academy: mLearning  for higher 
education.
Clark N. Quinn.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
LB 2395.7 Q56 2011
Seeing  systems:  unlocking  the mysteries of 
organizational life.
Barry Oshry.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2007.
HM 701 O855 2007
Street-level  bureaucracy:  dilemmas of the 
individual in public services.
Michael Lipsky.
New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, c2010.
HV 41 L53 2010
Thinking  through crisis:  improving teamwork and 
leadership in high-risk fields.
Amy L. Fraher.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
HD 49 F734 2011
Unmasking the face: a guide to recognizing 
emotions from facial clues.
Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen.
Cambridge, MA: Malor Books, 2003.
BF 637 C45 E38 2003
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VERY MODEST RESTRAINT NOT 
A DETENTION: RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL NOT TRIGGERED
R. v. Munkoh, 2012 ONCA 865
Following  the arrest of a robbery 
suspect and his detention in custody, 
police executed a warrant to search 
for the fruits of the robbery at his 
home where he lived with other 
family members (parents, brothers and sisters). 
Police knocked on the door, presented the warrant 
and were admitted into the residence. The three 
occupants at the time of entry were cooperative. 
Police secured the premises, locking  two pit bulls in 
a basement washroom. The occupants were escorted 
to the living  room/dining  room area of the house. 
They were not restrained in any way, but were not 
permitted to roam about the house during  the search 
and a police officer remained with them to ensure 
that they did not do so. The accused - a brother of 
the robbery suspect - was asked about the layout of 
the home, including  the location of his brother’s 
bedroom. He said he shared a bedroom in the 
basement with his brother (the robbery suspect) and 
explained where it was located. Police went to the 
shared bedroom, noted there were two beds, and 
searched it, finding  three digital scales, cash and a 
boxing  glove nailed to the wall. The glove contained 
crack cocaine in clear plastic wrap. The accused was 
handcuffed, arrested for possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking  (PPT) and read his right to 
counsel. He subsequently provided other statements 
and utterances, including  admissions that the 
cocaine was his. He was charged with PPT.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The trial judge admitted into evidence 
several of the statements and utterances 
made by the accused, finding  there were 
no Charter breaches. In particular, the 
judge concluded that the accused was not detained 
when the police entered his residence. Therefore, 
there was no requirement at that time for the police 
to advise him of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of 
the Charter nor provide him with a reasonable 
opportunity to call a lawyer. Even though his 
freedom of movement was curtailed, it was not 
sufficient to trigger the right to counsel. The judge 
stated:
There is no doubt that the police placed some 
degree of restraint on the movements of the 
accused and his siblings when they entered the 
house to conduct a search. They did not allow 
the occupants to enjoy free movement in the 
house during  the search to ensure the safety of 
the officers and the occupants, and to ensure 
that no one tampered with any evidence that 
might be in the premises. It is both reasonable 
and lawful for the police to do so. But the 
restraint went no further than that. The 
occupants were neither removed from the 
premises nor physically restrained. The 
interference with their liberty was very modest. 
While there was some dispute in the evidence 
about whether or not they were free to leave the 
house, the fact is that they did not want to leave 
while their home was being  searched, and the 
police simply did not turn their minds to the 
question. As I have said, the restraint placed on 
them was modest, and was in no way linked to 
any thought that they were implicated in any 
crime.   
Not every insignificant interference with liberty 
amounts to a detention for purposes of s. 10 of 
the Charter. The restraint on liberty here involved 
no significant physical or psychological restraint. 
The occupants of the residence were not 
detained during the search by virtue of the fact 
that they were temporarily deprived of the right 
to wander about their home. [reference omitted]
Nor was the accused detained when the detective 
asked him about the layout of the home. “The 
questioning  was not directed at the accused’s 
involvement in any offence, but instead was 
undertaken to permit the police to limit their search, 
at least initially, to the room in the house where the 
stolen property would most likely be found,” said 
the judge. “[The police] did not suspect that [the 
accused] was implicated in the robberies, and they 
had no reason to suspect that they were going  to 
find cocaine.” Thus, there was no obligation on 
police to comply with s. 10(b) before asking  him 
about the location of his brother’s bedroom. The 
accused’s statement identifying  the room he shared 
with his brother was admissible and he was 
convicted
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again challenged the 
admissibility of his statements. The 
Ontario Court Appeal, however, 
rejected his arguments. “We are 
satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to find 
that the [accused] was not detained during  the early 
part of the search of the house,” said the Court. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Case facts taken from R. v. Munkoh, 
2010 ONSC 2253.
OFFICER’S EXPERIENCE 
RELEVANT IN DETERMINING 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Wilson, 2012 BCCA 517
A police officer, whose patrol duties 
involved drug  investigations and 
speaking  frequently with addicts, 
received information from a barber 
that there was increased drug  activity 
near his shop in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. 
He also learned from two unnamed drug  addicts that 
drugs were being  sold near a slushie machine 
located close to the front door of a convenience 
store near the barbershop. At about 9:15 pm, the 
officer and his partner approached the convenience 
store and, looking  through a window, saw the 
accused standing  by the slushie machine holding 
open a black flat leather pouch. A woman held out 
cash to the accused, who put his hand in the pouch. 
An older, disheveled man, who appeared to be a 
drug  addict, stood to the left of the accused. 
Believing  he was observing  a drug  transaction, the 
officer entered the store, announced police presence 
and arrested the accused for possessing  narcotics for 
the purpose of trafficking  (PPT). He was searched 
incidental to arrest and 10 flaps of heroin and five 
“rocks” or pieces of crack cocaine were found in the 
pouch. The accused also had a drug  scale and 
$74.75 in cash. He was charged with PPT heroin 
and cocaine.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused sought to have the evidence 
excluded, submitting  the police lacked 
reasonable grounds to arrest and search 
him and thereby breached his rights 
under ss. 8  (unreasonable search) and 9 (arbitrary 
detention) of the Charter. The trial judge, however, 
found the arrest lawful under s. 495 of the Criminal 
Code. First, the arresting  officer subjectively had 
grounds to believe he had seen a drug  transaction 
take place. Second, the totality of the circumstances 
established objectively reasonable grounds for that 
subjective belief. The police received tips and saw a 
woman holding  out money to the accused. He was 
then seen reach into a black leather pouch. The 
people were not near the cash register and a person 
with the appearance of a drug  addict was standing 
nearby. Plus, in the officer’s experience he had 
previously seen drug  sellers carry drugs in leather 
pouches. The judge stated:
 
The fact that the information they had prior to 
making their observations about a specific 
convenience store and a specific place in that 
convenience store, that being the slushie 
machine, is relevant. The fact that the officers 
have seen on previous occasions drug  sellers or 
drug possessors carrying their drugs in leather 
pouches, like change purses, the officer said that 
he had seen that on at least 20 previous 
occasions. The fact that he saw a person facing 
[the accused] and reaching  out with her hand 
with money in it and him reaching into his 
pouch, those are relevant factors. The fact that 
they were all distanced by some 18  feet from 
where the cash register and so on was is also 
consistent with them not being in there for the 
purpose of buying  something from the store. 
Then the second male ... was standing right there 
and exhibiting symptoms and an appearance 
familiar to the officer of a drug-addicted person 
in that area. All, in my view, taken in totality, 
provide an objective basis, a reasonable basis for 
the officer’s belief that he was witnessing a drug 
transaction.
   
Thus, a reasonable person standing  in the shoes of 
the officer would have concluded reasonable 
grounds existed. The search that followed was 
therefore incident to arrest. The accused was 
convicted. 
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing 
the judge erred in relying  on the arresting  officer’s 
personal experience in determining  whether the 
necessary objective grounds for arrest existed. 
Furthermore, he also disagreed that there were 
objectively reasonable grounds in any event. 
Personal Experience
Under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code a peace officer is authorized 
to arrest a person without a 
wa r ra n t i f t h e y 
believe, on reasonable grounds, that 
the person has committed or is about 
to commit an indictable offence. The 
accused submitted that an officer’s 
experience should only be relevant in 
establishing  whether there were 
subjective grounds for an arrest, not 
wh e t h e r s u ch g r o u n d s w e r e 
objectively justified. He suggested 
that when experience is considered 
as part of the objective component, it 
increases the opportunities for racial-
profiling  and renders the warrantless 
arrest power unconstitutional. In his view, the 
“reasonable person” test for the objective 
component should be a “reasonable police officer” 
placed in the factual circumstances of the arresting 
officer, void of considering  the officer’s person 
experience. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected these 
arguments. The Supreme Court of Canada and other 
appellate courts have repeatedly held that there is a 
two-part test for considering  whether an officer has 
reasonable grounds to justify a warrantless arrest. 
First, the arresting  officer must subjectively have 
reasonable grounds for the arrest. Second, those 
grounds must also be justifiable from an objective 
point of view. This objective component requires a 
consideration of whether a reasonable person 
standing  in the shoes of the police officer would also 
conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the 
arrest. An arresting  officer’s personal experience has 
consistently been held to be a relevant consideration 
as to whether the officer’s subjective belief to arrest 
is objectively justified. “In my view, ... the [Supreme 
Court of Canada] articulated the reasonable person 
test as ‘a reasonable person standing  in the shoes of 
the police officer’ and ‘a reasonable person placed 
in the position of the officer’,” said Justice 
MacKenzie for the Court of Appeal. “The use of the 
definite, rather than the indefinite article, signals the 
arresting  officer’s personal experience and training 
are relevant to whether there were objective grounds 
to arrest under s. 495 of the Criminal Code.”
Objective Grounds
The accused submitted that, even 
considering  the officer’s experience, 
there were not sufficient objective 
grounds to arrest him. But this 
argument was also dismissed. The tips 
received by the officer and his 
observations at the convenience store 
supported a finding  that there were 
objectively reasonable grounds for 
the arrest. The information described 
drug  transactions at the convenience 
store. Although the tips were from 
unproven sources, their lack of 
reliability was offset by the specificity 
of the information and the conformity of the officer’s 
observations at the convenience store to the 
information. The trial judge correctly found the 
officer had the subjective grounds to arrest which 
were objectively reasonable. The arrest and 
incidental search were lawful and the drugs were 
admissible. 
The accused’s request for a five judge panel to hear 
his appeal was denied and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Follow your passion. Stay true to yourself. 
Never follow someone else’s path unless 
you’re in the woods and you’re lost and see a 
path. By all means, you should follow that.” - 
Ellen Degeneres
“[The Supreme Court of 
Canada] articulated the 
reasonable person test 
as ‘a reasonable person 
standing in the shoes of 
the police officer’ and ‘a 
reasonable person 
placed in the position of 
the officer’.”  
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STOP NOT MOTIVATED BY 
LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC CONCERN: 
DETENTION ARBITRARY
R. v. Gonzalez, 2012 ONCA 861
A uniformed police officer with 
Ottawa’s specialized “Guns and 
Gangs” Direct Action Response Team 
(DART), a unit tasked with the 
enforcement and intervention of 
firearm related offences as well as any crimes 
involving  gangs, saw what he regarded as a 
suspicious vehicle in an area known to him for 
potential gang  activity. Although it was not part of 
his regular duties to do traffic patrol or respond to 
regular dispatch calls, he could make stops under 
Ontario's Highway Traffic Act (HTA), respond to 
crimes he witnessed in progress, such as impaired 
driving, or intervene if specifically requested to do 
so. The officer recognized the car, which was being 
driven normally, as being  one he did a traffic stop on 
about three weeks earlier. On that occasion he had 
checked the driver for a licence and the vehicle’s 
insurance and licence plates, found nothing 
abnormal at the time and sent the driver (who was 
not the accused) on his way. Later, the officer 
learned the car was a rental vehicle owned by a 
“shady” business. 
The officer activated his lights, radioed in the stop 
and pulled the vehicle over in a parking  lot, 
blocking  it in a stall. The accused immediately 
opened his car door, got out and appeared to be 
looking  around with a view to running. The officer 
quickly walked up to the accused who was leaning 
back into the car. The officer grabbed the accused by 
the back of his coat and pulled him out. He could 
not produce documentation so the officer attempted 
to confirm his identity on the police computer. Four 
other DART officers arrived to assist. One of those 
officers, while walking  around the accused’s vehicle, 
shone a flashlight in through the open driver’s door, 
spotting  the end of a pistol barrel protruding  from 
under the driver's seat. The accused was arrested for 
“possession of a firearm”, cautioned and given his 
right to counsel. He was subsequently charged with 
five gun-related offences. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer testified he stopped the car to 
see if the driver was actually licensed and 
also because he spotted a crack in the 
rear bumper. He said the crack made him 
suspicious that the car might have been involved in 
a hit and run accident or perhaps an unreported 
collision. The accused argued that he had been 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the Charter during 
the roadside vehicle stop. The judge agreed, 
disbelieving  the officer’s claim that he stopped the 
car to enforce the HTA. Instead, the judge ruled that 
the officer stopped the vehicle because he 
associated it with gang  related criminal activity but 
had no reasonable or probable cause to believe the 
accused was engaging  in such activity. The officer 
was acting  on nothing  more than a mere suspicion. 
All he knew was that the car belonged to a “shady” 
rental agency which sometimes rented its cars to 
gang  members. “There was nothing  unlawful or 
suspicious about the manner in which the accused 
was operating  the car prior to the stop, and the 
professed concerns about the cracked bumper being 
related to an unreported accident or hit and run 
incident were mere speculation,” said the judge. 
“The accused's car was stopped and very quickly 
surrounded by three police vehicles and five 
uniformed officers who do not engage in traffic 
enforcement as any part of their regular duties.” 
Similarly, the judge rejected the officer’s assertion 
that he stopped the vehicle to ensure that its driver 
was licensed. “Any interest in the accused's driver's 
license was directed, I find, to the purpose of 
investigating  his potential involvement in gang 
related criminal activity,” said the judge. “This was 
not an instance where the police had a legitimate 
dual purpose (HTA enforcement and investigating 
crime).” Nor was it an investigative detention at 
common law because there was no articulable cause 
that the accused was criminally implicated in any 
particular criminal incident or event that was under 
investigation. Since the accused was not lawfully 
stopped under the HTA nor for the purpose of 
investigating  potential gang  related criminal activity 
based on reasonable cause for such a detention, the 
accused was arbitrarily detained under s. 9. The 
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handgun was subsequently excluded as evidence 
under s. 24(2) and acquittals followed on the firearm 
charges. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the acquittals, 
arguing  the trial judge erred in 
finding  an arbitrary detention. In 
the Crown’s view, the trial judge 
improperly considered the arrival of other DART 
officers to reject the detaining  officer’s evidence. The 
Crown also suggested that the judge mistakenly held 
that a valid HTA stop required some articulable 
cause relating  to the driver’s own conduct and failed 
to consider the totality of the evidence before 
making  a factual finding  that traffic safety was not a 
purpose for the stop. The Ontario Court of Appeal, 
however, did not accept these submissions. 
A trial judge’s determination as to the purpose of a 
traffic stop is a finding  of fact that is not subject to 
judicial review. In this case, the number and role of 
the police during  the roadside stop and the totality 
of the evidence were such factual issues. Even so, 
the trial judge did consider the totality of the 
evidence and, having  done so, disbelieved the 
police officer’s testimony. Further, “the trial judge did 
not suggest that the police needed an articulable 
cause in order to make an HTA stop,” said the Court 
of Appeal. “Rather, the trial judge reviewed the 
evidence and concluded that the stop was not made 
for an HTA purpose but rather was a pretext because 
of suspicions of gang-related criminal activity.” As 
for s. 24(2) and the admissibility of the evidence, the 
Court of Appeal found no basis for interfering  with 
the trial judge’s decision. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed and the accused’s acquittal was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“You may not realize it when it happens, 
but a kick in the teeth may be the best 
thing in the world for you.” - Walt Disney
COMPELLING TIP FROM 
RELIABLE INFORMER PROVIDED 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Noorali, 2012 ONCA 589
At about noon a detective met with 
a carded confidential informant who 
had provided information in the 
past. The source said that a male, 
described as brown, perhaps 
Guyanese, 5’10” tall, 160 lbs, with a goatee, would 
arrive at a mall’s parking  lot later that afternoon in a 
four-door, older-model gold Toyota Camry with dark 
tinted windows and a licence plate of ANEV 261. 
The source also stated that a loaded firearm would 
be inside the vehicle. A detective attended the mall 
area and at 3:30 pm saw a Camry turn into the 
parking  lot. There were two occupants and the 
vehicle matched the description provided including 
the licence plate number. A “high-risk takedown” 
was initiated. The vehicle was boxed in and its driver 
(the accused) and passenger were arrested for 
possession of a firearm. The Camry was searched 
and a Browning  9 mm machine pistol, two over-
capacity magazines (one loaded), ammunition, 
marihuana, powder cocaine, crack cocaine and a 
scale were found in the trunk. The accused was 
charged with several crimes, including  firearm, 
ammunition and drug related offences.  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused sought to have all of the 
evidence found in the trunk excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter, suggesting  it 
was obtained in a manner that breached 
the search and seizure provisions found in s. 8. The 
trial judge recognized that “a police officer who 
makes an arrest or conducts a search at the request 
or direction of a fellow officer need not personally 
be in possession of reasonable and probable 
grounds for the arrest or search so long  as those 
grounds are in the hands of the officer making  the 
request or giving  the direction.” So in this case, 
although the detective did not participate in the 
takedown he “pulled the trigger” on it and the arrest 
would be lawful if he possessed the necessary 
grounds. 
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The judge found the detective not only had the 
necessary subjective belief that the accused was in 
possession of a firearm but that it was also 
objectively reasonable based on the totality of the 
circumstances. First , the information was 
compelling. The source provided specific details 
about the make, model, color, vintage and licence 
plate number of the suspect vehicle. He also said it 
had four doors and tinted windows and provided a 
specific location to which the vehicle would be 
driven and a specified time frame within which this 
was going  to occur. He also said that there would be 
a firearm within the vehicle. Second, the informant 
was credible. He was not an untested, anonymous 
informant, but a “carded” confidential source who 
had provided information in the past on at least two 
prior instances that led to successful seizures of 
illicit items, including  a firearm. Finally, the 
information was corroborated. As predicted by the 
source, a specific motor vehicle arrived at a specific 
location within a specific time frame. “[The 
detective] was entitled to regard those circumstances 
as corroborative notwithstanding  that the 
corroboration did not relate specifically to whether 
there was a firearm in the motor vehicle,” said the 
judge. “The specificity of the information provided 
by the confidential source, the past history of the 
source as a reliable informant and the confirmation 
afforded when the specific vehicle described by the 
source was seen doing  precisely what the source 
said it would be doing  at the predicted time and 
place furnished [the detective] with objectively 
reasonable grounds for his belief.” The arrest was 
lawful and the search that followed was reasonable 
as incident to arrest. The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to 8 ½ years in prison less 33 months pre-
trial custody, prohibited from possessing  firearms 
and ordered to give a DNA sample. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, among 
other grounds, that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that the search was 
reasonable. But the Ontario Court 
of Appeal disagreed. The trial judge correctly applied 
the law. The detective had the vehicle’s licence 
number from the confidential informer, the detail in 
the tip was compelling  and the informer was 
reliable. The accused’s appeal from conviction was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Case facts taken from R. v. Noorali, 
2010 ONSC 2558, 2010 ONSC 3747.
YCJA TAINT RENDERS 
SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT 
INADMISSIBLE
R. v. M.D., 2012 ONCA 841
Following  his arrest for a robbery, 
the teenage accused was taken to 
the police station where he was 
booked and lodged in an interview 
room. He had been advised of his 
right to counsel and his mother was notified. Two 
detectives entered the interview room intending  to 
build a rapport and see whether the accused wished 
to give “his side of the story.” There was no video 
equipment in the room so police only took notes 
about the discussion, which lasted about 12 
minutes. During  this interview the police did not 
comply with the requirements of statement taking 
under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). 
The accused made some admissions about the 
robbery and the interview ended with a question, 
“do you want to tell us this on video?” He was left in 
the interview room for an hour, then moved to 
another room with recording  equipment where he 
was interviewed for a second time by the same 
officers. 
Before this interview the police again explained the 
offences, told the accused he could go to a 
detention centre if convicted and informed him he 
could be sentenced as an adult to a maximum term 
of imprisonment for life. He was read, explained and 
said he understood his rights under the YCJA. The 
officer confirmed that they had earlier talked and 
that the accused had expressed an interest in 
providing  a statement. He was never told during  the 
second interview that he should not be influenced 
by the fact he earlier spoke to police or that the first 
statement was inadmissible. During  questioning  an 
inculpatory recorded statement was obtained. 
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Ontario Court of Justice
At trial both detectives agreed that they 
had not complied with the requirements 
of s. 146 of the YCJA when they first 
interviewed the accused. The Crown, 
however, only sought to have the second statement 
entered as evidence. In its view, the videotaped 
interview was voluntary, complied with s. 146 and 
was untainted by the earlier voluntary statement. 
Any taint from the first statement was remedied at 
the outset by a full explanation and confirmed 
understanding  of each of the s. 146(2) requirements. 
The accused, on the other hand, contended that the 
non-recorded first interview was not voluntary and 
tainted the second interview. In his view, the time 
period between the two interviews was brief, the 
same officers were involved, the second interview 
referenced the first one and was simply a 
continuation of it. It should have been excluded.
The trial judge found the first statement voluntary 
but not compliant with s. 146, which would have 
rendered it inadmissible had it been tendered as 
evidence. But she also concluded that the 
videotaped second interview would have taken 
place even if the first interview had not occurred. 
Neither the making  of the first statement nor its non-
compliance with s. 146 rendered the videotaped 
second interview inadmissible. The videotaped 
interview began with a lengthy discussion and 
confirmed the accused’s understanding  of the s. 146 
requirements. He wanted to give his side of the story, 
an intention evidenced by his demeanour during  the 
second statement. A conviction for robbery 
followed.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the 
videotaped interview should not 
have been admitted as evidence. In 
his view, the derived confessions 
rule requires that subsequent statements of an 
accused made after an earlier inadmissible statement 
should too be ruled inadmissible if there was a 
sufficient connection between the statements and a 
failure to extinguish the taint of the first statement 
from the making  of the second one. Justice Watt, 
speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, agreed. 
Derived Confessions Rule
The derived confessions rule was originally 
developed in relation to a confession’s voluntariness 
requirement at common law. However, today the 
rule has a more general application and applies 
where a subsequent statement sought to be admitted 
is sufficiently connected to an earlier inadmissible 
statement. In addition to the voluntariness rule, 
inadmissibility could arise from contaminants such 
as constitutional infringements (eg. s. 10(b) of the 
Charter) or a failure to comply with the requirements 
for taking  a young  person’s statement under s. 146. 
But not all tainted confessions will be excluded 
irrespective of the degree of their connection to the 
prior inadmissible statement.  In deciding  whether a 
subsequent statement will be excluded, a judge must 
examine all of the relevant circumstances in 
determining  the degree of connection (or taint) 
between the two statements. These factors include:
• the time span between the statements;
• advertence to the earlier statement during 
questioning in the subsequent interview;
• discovery of additional information after 
completion of the first statement;
• the presence of the same police officers during 
both interviews; and
• other similarities between the two sets of 
circumstances.
Justice Watt explained it this way:
The application of these factors will render a 
subsequent statement involuntary if either the 
tainting features that disqualified the first 
continue to be present, or if the fact that the first 
statement was made was a substantial factor that 
contributed to the making of the second 
statement. It will generally be easier to establish 
that tainting affected the first when both these 
conditions are present. In the end, however, 
what matters most and mandates exclusion is 
that the connection is sufficient for the second to 
have been contaminated by the first.
The inquiry required when the derived 
confessions rule is invoked to exclude a 
subsequent statement is essentially a causation 
inquiry that involves a consideration of the 
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temporal, contextual, and causal connections 
between the proffered and earlier statements. 
The inquiry is a case-specific factual inquiry. 
[references omitted, paras. 55-56]
In this case, the trial judge found the first statement 
voluntary and the accused did not attempt to 
demonstrate there was a constitutional violation, 
such as s. 10(b). The trial judge did, however, err in 
applying  the derived confessions rule as it related to 
non-compliance with s. 146(2)(b) of the YCJA.  “The 
error in this case consisted of a failure to consider all 
the relevant circumstances in the application of the 
derived confessions rule,” said Justice Watt. “Taken 
as a whole, the evidence disclosed that the tainting 
features that disqualified the first statement from 
admission continued to be present during  the 
second and that the fact the first statement had been 
made was a substantial factor that contributed to the 
making  of the second that was little more than a 
continuation of the first.” The Court of Appeal 
continued:
The first interview concluded with a question 
from [a detective] about whether the [accused] 
wanted to tell the police about the robbery on 
video.  The [accused] agreed. Immediately after 
completing his s. 146(2)(b) advice at the start of 
the second interview, [the detective] reminded 
[the accused] of his offer and the interview 
proceeded. The same officers conducted both 
interviews without [the accused] having any 
contact with anyone else in the hour that 
separated the two interviews. 
The trial judge does not appear to have 
considered the effect of [the detective’s] failure 
to tell [the accused] about the inadmissibility of 
the prior statement at the outset, indeed at any 
time during  the second interview. This admission 
left [the accused], a 14-year-old grade 9 student, 
with an incomplete understanding of his 
jeopardy when deciding whether to speak or 
remain silent. In the circumstances of this case, 
such advice was necessary to dispel the taint 
associated with the first interview.  Its absence 
cemented the connection between the two 
statements. In a similar way, the failure to advise 
[the accused] that, in deciding whether to speak 
a second time, he should not be influenced by 
the fact that he had talked to the police earlier, 
or by what he had said then, was an essential 
factor that required, but did not receive 
consideration in the admissibility decision. 
[paras. 75-76]
The trial judge failed to properly apply the derived 
confessions rule when she admitted the accused’s 
videotaped police interview as evidence. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, the videotaped 
interview was inadmissible, the conviction set aside 
and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Derived Confessions Rule
• A second (or subsequent) statement made 
after an earlier inadmissible statement will 
also be inadmissible provided there is a 
sufficient connection between the two 
statements by:
1. the tainting features that disqualified the 
prior statement continuing to be present, 
or
2. the first statement was a substantial factor 
that contributed to the making of the 
second statement.
• Contaminants that can taint a second 
statement include:
✴ lack of voluntariness (under the 
common law confessions rule)
✴ constitutional infringement, such as 
s. 10(b) of the Charter where admissibility 
will be determined under s. 24(2)
✴ non-compliance with s. 146(2) of 
the YCJA
• In determining whether there is a sufficient 
connection for a second statement to be 
contaminated by the first, a fact-based 
assessment is used. This inquiry involves:
• temporal connection
• contextual connection
• causal connection
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INTERVIEWEE AWARE OF 
CONSEQUENCES:
STATEMENT ADMISSIBLE
R. v. D.M., 2012 ONCA 894
The police received a complaint from 
the Children’s Aid Society (CAS) that 
the accused had sexually abused his 
step-daughter. The police officer 
assigned to investigate the incident 
called the victim but she refused to make a formal 
complaint. Nonetheless, the officer wanted to speak 
to the accused and left a message at his home, 
which was not returned. About a month later the 
accused was stopped for speeding  by a different 
officer and was asked to attend the police station to 
meet with the investigator. After arriving  at the police 
station the accused was taken to a small interview 
room and told he was not obliged to see the officer 
or remain at the station, and did not need to answer 
any of her questions. No right to counsel warning 
was given. The officer told the accused that a report 
of inappropriate touching  was made to CAS but the 
victim had not complained to police. He went on to 
admit that he had “touched” the victim “five or six 
times” about four years earlier, that the matter had 
been addressed by the family and police need not 
be involved. He refused to provide any details about 
the touching  and said he did not see why he needed 
to answer police questions. The interview lasted 25 
minutes and concluded with the officer saying  the 
investigation was “closed” unless the victim changed 
her mind and gave a statement. The victim did 
change her mind and the accused was charged.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial the police investigator testified she 
hoped to obtain a confession from the 
accused about the allegation of sexual 
assault she was investigating. But she did 
not believe that there were sufficient grounds to lay 
a charge or consider him detained so she did not 
advise him of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of 
the Charter. The accused also testified, stating  he did 
not want to meet with the officer and found the 
interview to be intimidating.  He said that he 
acknowledged he had touched the victim five or six 
times because he believed the police investigation 
was related to the CAS complaint and it was in his 
best interests to cooperate and be consistent. 
The trial judge ruled that the accused’s statement 
was voluntary and admissible. The interview was not 
conducted in an atmosphere of oppression, as the 
accused was permitted to attend and leave the 
station on his own. The officer told the accused he 
did not have to remain or answer her questions and 
he was well aware of his right to refuse to co-operate 
with the investigation. Finally, the accused’s 
statement to the police was not tainted by his 
previous statement to the CAS.  He said the same 
thing  to the CAS and police for consistency. The 
accused was convicted of several sex-related crimes 
and sentenced to five years in prison. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Common Law Confessions Rule
“The confessions rule is 
c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
voluntariness, broadly 
defined. The application 
of the confessions rule 
is contextual, requiring 
a trial judge to take into account all relevant 
circumstances in order to determine whether the 
prosecution has established the voluntariness of 
the confession beyond a reasonable doubt.
Recording police interviews of persons suspected 
or accused of crime can be of inestimable value in 
assessing their voluntariness at trial. Video 
recordings permit the trial judge to be an ear and 
eyewitness to the interview tendered for 
admission.” - Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice 
Watt in R. v. M.D., 2012 ONCA 841 at paras. 39-40, 42.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
conviction arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred 
in applying  the common law 
confessions rule. In his view, the “voluntariness” of a 
confession has two elements: (1) a knowing  waiver 
of the right to silence and (2) knowledge of the 
consequences of speaking  to the police. So although 
he was cautioned on his right to silence and 
knowingly waived that right, he was not told and 
was unaware of the consequences of speaking  to the 
police – what he said could be used against him in a 
criminal prosecution.  He thought that the police 
interview was a continuation of the CAS 
investigation into the safety of his other children and 
he did not appreciate that his admissions to police 
were made in the context of a criminal investigation 
about the sex abuse allegations.
Justice Laskin, delivering  the unanimous Court of 
Appeal judgement, first noted that the accused was 
not under arrest or detained when interviewed by 
police and thus his Charter rights were not triggered.  
However, he was a suspect in a criminal 
investigation when interviewed and therefore the 
common law confessions rule applied.  “The 
confessions rule requires the Crown to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession made 
by a suspect to a person in authority, such as the 
admission in this case, was voluntary,” said Justice 
Laskin. “Voluntariness is not only concerned with 
whether the accused’s confession was induced by 
threats or promises; it is a broader concept focused 
on the protection of an accused’s rights and fairness 
in the criminal process.  A court must, therefore, 
consider all the circumstances in which the accused 
spoke to determine whether a statement given to a 
police officer was made voluntarily.”
Even assuming  that not being  aware of the 
consequences of speaking  to the police is a relevant 
circumstance in assessing  voluntariness, the accused 
in this case was fully aware of the consequences of 
speaking to the police. Justice Laskin stated:
The [accused] is an intelligent and highly-
educated man.  [The officer’s] line of questioning 
at the police station was not misleading; she 
confronted the [accused] directly with [the 
victim’s] allegations. He knew what the police 
were investigating. 
The [accused] a lso appears genera l ly 
knowledgeable about the potential legal 
consequences of his actions.  After he was 
interviewed by the CAS, for example, he 
consulted a lawyer.  And the most telling 
evidence that he was aware of the consequences 
of speaking to the police was his refusal to 
provide [the officer] with details of the touching, 
instead telling her he did not see why he needed 
to answer her questions. [paras. 45-46] 
Furthermore, what the accused told police was what 
he already acknowledged to the victim and the CAS 
worker. Any error the trial judge made in admitting 
the statement to police was harmless since the 
accused’s other acknowledgments of his wrong 
doing were admissible at trial.
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed, but his sentence was reduced from five 
years in prison to four years. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is 
the courage to continue that counts.” - 
Winston Churchill
“The confessions rule requires the Crown to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a confession made by a suspect to a person in authority ... was 
voluntary. ... A court must, therefore, consider all the circumstances in which the 
accused spoke to determine whether a statement given to a police officer was made 
voluntarily.”
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DETENTION CRYSTALIZED AFTER 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
FORMED
R. v. Gray, 2012 ONCA 687
At about 4:15 am two plain clothes 
police officers were investigating  a 
possible stolen vehicle at a hotel 
when they learned that a man and his 
friend were robbed of $1,500 and a 
necklace. The suspects were described as three 
males; one white and two black. The man provided 
a general description of the perpetrators’ clothing 
and hairstyle. Police then called the complainant’s 
friend on a cell phone and was told that two of the 
robbers were walking  about two blocks away. The 
officers immediately responded to that area and 
located two black males, including  the accused. The 
men matched the description of the perpetrators and 
the officers stopped them. They told the accused 
they were police officers investigating  an incident, 
asked him to keep his hands out of his pockets and 
requested he identify himself. 
The accused provided a name that the officers 
learned was false and he was arrested for obstructing 
police, handcuffed, advised of his right to counsel 
and cautioned. Further inquiries revealed he was on 
bail with conditions not to possess non-prescribed 
drugs or cell phones and had a no-go to the city. 
When he was searched police found two cell 
phones and $1,775 cash, separated into three 
bundles. He was placed in the police car and 
observed to shake three baggies of crack cocaine 
from his pant leg. The accused was charged with 
obstructing  police, breaching  his recognizance, 
possessing  proceeds of crime and possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.                
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused contended that he was 
arbitrarily detained by police and was not 
advised of the reason for his detention nor 
of his right to counsel when stopped. The 
search, he maintained, was unreasonable and in 
breach of his s. 8  Charter rights. In his view, the 
police had no lawful reason to detain him and to ask 
him for identification. He claimed the police lied 
about the reason for the stop and were not 
investigating  a robbery. He suggested they only 
stopped and questioned him because he was a black 
man walking  down the street in the middle of the 
night, using  the robbery investigation as a ruse. The 
trial judge, however, rejected the submission that the 
officers fabricated a description of two black males 
to justify stopping the accused and his friend.
As for the arbitrariness of the detention and the 
triggering  of s. 10 Charter rights, the judge 
concluded that the accused was not immediately 
detained when the police got out of their car and 
confronted him. “Whether a person is detained is an 
objective determination, made in light of all of the 
circumstances of the case,” said the judge. In this 
case, the judge found that the accused was not 
detained when police initially stopped, conversed 
with and asked him for identification. Rather, a 
detention materialized only after the officer became 
suspicious that the accused was providing  a false 
name and thereby obstructing  him. At that point, 
however, the officer’s suspicion that a false name 
was given was reasonable and the accused’s 
detention for the purpose of investigating  his true 
identity was justified and not arbitrary. The judge 
stated:
I am also mindful that police investigations are 
fluent and often take new directions. What 
began as an investigation into a possible stolen 
car evolved into an investigation of a robbery, 
which was then overtaken by an investigation 
into an obstruction of police and breach of 
recognizance. I am satisfied that the officers 
were at all times acting within their lawful duties 
and did not arbitrarily detain the accused. 
 
But the judge held that the accused’s rights under s. 
10 of the Charter were breached. He was never told 
why he was being  detained or advised of his right to 
counsel until his arrest. The evidence, however, was 
ruled admissible under s. 24(2).  
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed the trial 
judge’s Charter ruling, asserting 
that he was detained before he 
verbally identified himself under a 
false name to the officer and the trial judge erred in 
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concluding  otherwise. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed, finding  there was ample evidence for the 
trial judge’s decision and no basis for interfering  with 
her fact finding. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Case facts taken from R. v. Gray, 2010 
ONCJ 629.
ASSUMING BREACH, EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE: OFFICER HAD 
LEGITIMATE SAFETY CONCERN
R. v. Bashir, 2012 ONCA 793
A police officer stopped at a 
restaurant to buy a sandwich at about 
7 pm and noticed an unoccupied red 
Ford Focus parked illegally. Half of it 
was on the sidewalk and its motor 
was running.  When the officer went into the 
restaurant and got in line behind the accused and 
his two friends, they stopped talking. The officer 
could smell alcohol on them and noticed the 
accused, who had a large bandage on his face, leave 
suddenly without his friends. The officer was 
suspicious that he had driven off alone and wanted 
to make sure that he was not driving  under the 
influence of alcohol. As he drove in the vicinity of 
the restaurant looking  for the Ford Focus, he saw its 
brake lights flashing  a short distance nearby and felt 
it was trying  to avoid him. He pulled in behind it 
and the accused was in the driver’s seat. The accused 
suddenly got out and went towards the officer. He 
was belligerent and used expletives. The officer 
began to suspect the accused might be suspended or 
not permitted to have the vehicle. When asked to 
produce a licence and whether the vehicle was his, 
the accused responded with further expletives saying 
it was not his car, that he did not know anything 
about it, and that the accused could tow it if he 
wanted. He stated: “I ain’t telling  you my name” 
“you did not see shit” and “fuck you.” At this point, 
backup was summoned. 
After the accused refused to identify himself or take 
his hands out of his pockets, the officer advised him 
that he was being  detained for investigation in 
connection to the car he had been driving. He was 
handcuffed and placed in the police car where the 
officer tried to read him his rights, but was spoken 
over. Open alcohol containers were visible in the 
car and an odour of alcohol emanated from its 
interior through an open window. Police searched 
the car under s. 32 of Ontario’s Liquor Licence Act 
(LLA) and found a loaded handgun under a t-shirt in 
a cloth bag. The bag, similar to those sold at grocery 
stores with two wide handles and an open mouth 
which could not be sealed or clasped, was in plain 
view on the back seat. Numerous firearm-related 
charges were laid against the accused.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued, in part, that this was 
a pretext stop, a misuse of Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA) powers to 
pursue a criminal investigation, and was 
therefore arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter. In his 
view, there were no grounds for arrest. He also 
suggested that the power of search under the LLA 
could not justify the search of the cloth bag. 
Furthermore, he contended that the HTA powers 
were merely a ruse to justify targeting  him when the 
officer did not have proper grounds but merely an 
unfounded suspicion. 
 
The trial judge concluded that the accused was 
lawfully detained. This was not a random stop but an 
investigation properly made into whether the 
accused might be driving  while impaired, a 
suspended driver or might be in possession of a 
stolen vehicle. The detention was based on the 
officer smelling  alcohol on the accused and his 
suspicious behaviour in leaving  the restaurant 
without his companions, driving  a short distance 
from the restaurant and then parking  partially on the 
sidewalk and flashing  his brakes lights. An 
investigative detention commenced once the 
accused was told that he would be restrained and 
refused to remove his hands from his pockets. This 
refusal gave rise to an appropriate concern for officer 
safety. 
The search of the vehicle after the accused was 
detained was also reasonable. The LLA makes it an 
offence to operate a motor vehicle, whether it is in 
motion or not, with open alcohol in it and permits 
police to enter and search. Police saw open alcohol, 
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as well as red plastic cups, within the driver’s reach 
and smelled alcohol from outside the car. When 
searching  the car, a heavy cloth bag  was searched, 
although outside the reach of any driver. It was 
during  this that police discovered the handgun. 
“Given the large amount of alcohol found in the car, 
police were entitled to look into the cloth grocery 
bag, and look beneath the visible t-shirt because of 
the weight of the bag,” said the judge.  “We now 
know that the weight came from a handgun and not 
a bottle of alcohol.” 
This was not a random search, but a lawfully 
authorized warrantless one made after open bottles 
of liquor were seen. Having  found bottles of liquor 
in other parts of the vehicle, it was reasonable to 
believe that further alcohol might be found in the 
bag, particularly because of its weight. And, even if 
the accused’s Charter rights were breached, the trial 
judge would have admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2). He was convicted of several firearm-related 
offences and sentenced to six years in prison, less 
five months spent in pre-trial custody. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his 
detention for investigation was 
unlawful, breached s. 9 (arbitrary 
detent ion) and should have 
resulted in the exclusion of the loaded handgun as 
evidence under s. 24(2). This submission, however, 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Assuming, 
without deciding, that the accused’s s. 9 rights were 
breached and there was a sufficient link or nexus 
between that breach and the search of the vehicle, 
the trial judge did not err in admitting  the evidence. 
First, the officer acted in good faith. “Even if there 
were insufficient grounds to suspect the [accused] of 
a specific offence, his behaviour clearly gave rise to 
a legitimate concern regarding  officer safety that 
required some defensive action,” said the Court of 
Appeal. Second, if a s. 9 breach occurred, it had a 
minimal impact upon the accused’s Charter-
protected interests. “There was only a temporal 
connection between the investigative detention and 
the search of the vehicle,” the Court stated. “The 
[accused] effectively abandoned any interest in the 
vehicle. He was not the owner, he told the officer 
that he was not the driver and he invited the officer 
to have the vehicle towed away. The officer was 
entitled to look into the window of the vehicle and 
when he saw open bottles of alcohol, he was 
entitled to search the vehicle pursuant to s. 32(5) of 
the [LLA].” Finally, the evidence was reliable and 
society had a strong  interest in an adjudication of 
these serious offences involving  a loaded handgun. 
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed and his six year sentence was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Case facts taken from R. v. Bashir, 
2010 ONCJ 317.
Live & Online 
March 21, 2013 
Optional Workshop 
March 22, 2013 
www.osgoodepd.ca/cle/2012-2013Fiscal/2013_search_warrants/index.html 
BY THE BOOK:
S. 32(5): Ontario’s Liquor Licence Act
Search of vehicle or boat
A police officer who has 
reasonable grounds to believe 
that liquor is being  unlawfully 
kept in a vehicle or boat may at 
any time, without a warrant, 
enter and search the vehicle or 
boat and search any person 
found in it.
 Search
Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
REGISTER NOW
AGENDA
PROGRAM FACULTY
WHO SHOULD
ATTEND
PRICE
 CREDITS
REQUEST
BROCHURE
DOWNLOAD
BROCHURE PDF
SPONSOR THIS
PROGRAM
HOTEL & PARKING
 Search
Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
REGISTER NOW
AGENDA
PROGRAM FACULTY
WHO SHOULD
ATTEND
PRICE
 CREDITS
REQUEST
BROCHURE
DOWNLOAD
BROCHURE PDF
SPONSOR THIS
PROGRAM
HOTEL & PARKING
Volume 13 Issue 1 - January/February 2013
PAGE 17
CUMULATIVE EFFECT SUPPORTS 
GROUNDS FOR ARREST
R. v. West, 2012 NSCA 112
Following  a robbery at a Bank of 
Montreal, police received a 911 call 
at about 9:20 am describing  the 
robber as a six foot tall slender male. 
It was also subsequently learned that 
a white Intrepid automobile may have been 
involved. A tow truck company owner alerted police 
that a white Intrepid had left the road and was being 
towed from the ditch. He told police that he thought 
the car may have been involved in a robbery. A 
police officer came upon the tow truck with the 
white Intrepid and saw the accused, a known bank 
robber. He was approximately six feet tall and 160 
pounds. The officer took no action at that time, 
followed them and called for backup. At 11:55 am 
the police stopped the tow truck and identified the 
accused as the driver of the Intrepid. But he was not 
told why he was being  stopped. The accused 
assented to a search of the vehicle but nothing 
connected to the robbery was found. After some 
discussion among  the officers, the accused was 
arrested on suspicion of bank robbery at 12:30 pm 
and advised of his right to counsel. He subsequently 
gave an inculpatory statement and was charged with 
several offences related to the robbery. 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that he was arbitrarily detained 
under s. 9 of the Charter when he was 
stopped and arrested, and denied his 
rights under s. 10(a). The trial judge ruled that the 
accused had been detained when the tow truck in 
which he was a passenger was stopped at 11:55 am. 
But the detention was not arbitrary. Under s. 495(1)
(a) of the Criminal Code all the police needed to 
demonstrate was reasonable grounds. It was not 
necessary to establish a prima facie case for 
conviction. Here, not only did the police officer 
personally believe he had reasonable grounds to 
arrest, those grounds were objectively established. “I 
find the cumulative effect of the various factors, 
including  [the accused] generally matched the 
description of the robber, [he] was driving  a white 
Intrepid, a vehicle thought to be involved in the 
robbery, the police knowledge of [him], gave the 
police reasonable and probable grounds to arrest,” 
said the judge.
As for s. 10(a), the judge concluded that the 
accused’s rights had been breached. The accused 
had not been informed of the reason for his 
detention at the time the tow truck was stopped. 
However, since no evidence had been obtained 
during  this time, there was no evidence to exclude 
under s. 24(2). The accused, when arrested, was then 
advised of the reason for the arrest and of his right to 
counsel. The police complied with the informational 
component of 10 at this time. The accused was 
convicted.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused again argued, among 
other things, that he was arbitrarily 
detained. In his view, he was 
detained and arrested because he 
was a known criminal. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed, finding  the evidence supported 
objectively substantiated reasonable grounds to 
detain and arrest. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.ns.ca
CRIMINAL CODE DOES NOT 
CREATE ARMED ROBBERY 
OFFENCE
R. v. Moore, 2012 ONCA 770
The accused presented a false driver’s 
licence at a car dealership and went 
for a test drive with a car salesman. 
He stopped the vehicle on the side of 
the highway and told the salesman to 
“get the fuck out of the car”. The salesman claimed 
the accused had a pistol and pointed it at him. He 
was terrified by these events and turned his head to 
look out the window. The accused was charged with 
several offences including  robbery. It alleged he 
“did, while armed with a firearm, to wit: a handgun, 
rob [the salesman], contrary to Section 344 of the 
Criminal Code.
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The trial judge was not 
satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused was 
carrying  a handgun or that he 
pointed it at the salesman.  “While I do 
not doubt [the salesman’s] sincerity, he is not 
familiar with guns and saw and heard something 
only fleetingly,” said the judge. “Out of great fear for 
his safety, he quickly turned his head away from [the 
accused] toward the window. The accused was 
acquitted of the robbery charge, but convicted of 
seven other offences related to the incident.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal submitting  that the trial 
judge erred by finding  that the 
Criminal Code creates an offence 
of “armed robbery” and that the use of a firearm was 
an essential element to the robbery charge. The 
Court of Appeal agreed: 
The Criminal Code does not, in fact, create an 
offence of armed robbery. Section 343 of the 
Criminal Code creates the offence of robbery 
and describes the four ways in which robbery 
may be committed. A count that charges robbery 
and refers to s. 344, the punishment provision, 
does not specify a particular mode of 
committing robbery nor limit the basis upon 
which the Crown may prove the substantive 
offence of robbery. [para. 6]
The inclusion of the words “while armed with a 
firearm, to wit: a handgun” puts an accused on 
notice that, if convicted of a robbery and it’s proven 
a firearm was used, a minimum mandatory 
punishment of four years imprisonment applies. 
The Crown could prove a robbery under one of the 
four ways described in s. 343. Then, if the Crown 
wanted to engage the s. 344 minimum mandatory 
punishment it would need prove for sentencing 
purposes that the accused used the firearm in the 
commission of the robbery within any definition of 
s. 343. The trial judge erred in finding  the accused 
not guilty of the robbery as charged, his acquittal 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Case facts taken from R. v. Moore, 
2010 ONSC 6414.
DANGEROUS PURPOSE PROVEN: 
NO EVIDENCE ATTACK 
UNAVOIDABLE
R. v. Sakebow, 2012 SKCA 84
Police were looking  for the accused 
as a parle violator. There was a 
parole suspension warrant out for 
him and a vehicle associated to him 
was seen at about 3:30 am. The 
officer activated his lights and the vehicle slowed 
but continued driving. He observed the driver lean 
forward and thought he might be placing  something 
out of view. The vehicle stopped and the accused 
was arrested. He was wearing  an armoured vest with 
an RCMP crest sewn on it. Police looked under the 
driver's seat and found a fully loaded .22 calibre 
semi-automatic handgun while 50 rounds of 
ammunition were found in the glove box. The 
accused was charged with several crimes including 
possessing  a weapon (the handgun) for a purpose 
dangerous to the public peace under s. 88 of the 
Criminal Code. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
At trial the accused was acquitted of the 
possession for a dangerous purpose 
charge. The judge concluded that the 
accused possessed the handgun for self-
defense. He was sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment, less time served, for the other charges 
he faced. 
“The Criminal Code does not, in fact, create an 
offence of armed robbery. Section 343 of the Criminal 
Code creates the offence of robbery and describes 
the four ways in which robbery may be committed.”
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown’s appea l o f the 
accused’s acquittal was allowed. 
Although the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Kerr, 2004 SCC 44 
held that possession of a weapon for self-defence is 
not possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous 
to the public peace if there is evidence that the 
perceived attack was unavoidable, there was no 
such evidence of an unavoidable attack. Here, the 
trial judge erred by holding  that the accused’s 
possession of the weapon for a self-defence purpose 
led to the legal conclusion he did not possess the 
weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace. “An examination of all of the evidence 
including  the nature of the weapon and the 
circumstances under which it was possessed leads to 
the inescapable inference the weapon was 
possessed for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace,” said Justice Herauf. The accused’s acquittal 
was set aside and a conviction under s. 88  of the 
Criminal Code was entered. The case was remitted to 
the trial judge to impose a fit sentence.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note:  Case facts taken from R. v. Sakebow, 
2012 SKQB 81.
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE 
REQUIRES SPECIFIC INTENT
R. v. Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91
The accused and his companion 
reported an impaired driver to police. 
Acting  on this information, the police 
arrested the driver for impaired 
driving  and driving  while over 80mg
%. At the impaired trial the Certificate of Analyses of 
the driver’s blood-alcohol content was excluded. 
Since the arresting  officers had not witnessed any 
aberrant driving, the Crown called the accused and 
his companion as eyewitnesses to the driving. The 
accused, however, refused to be sworn or to testify. 
He said he understood that tipsters who report 
impaired drivers were to remain anonymous, that 
Crown had a written statement from his companion 
and that his companion was scheduled to testify. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Possess Weapon for Dangerous 
Purpose & Self Defence
“In my view, the crucial issue in those 
cases where the accused person is found 
to have possessed a weapon for a 
defensive purpose is whether or not the 
attack which the accused purported to thwart was 
avoidable.  Thus, only where the attack is completely 
inescapable is possession of a weapon to thwart the 
attack not possession for a purpose dangerous to the 
public peace.  To the contrary, the purposeful act then 
constitutes an abatement of a danger to the public 
peace, namely, an attack on one’s self.  Many indicia will 
be relevant to the determination of avoidability, 
including, inter alia: location, atmosphere, nature of the 
threat, imminence of the danger, and actual use.  “ - 
Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Major in R. v. Kerr, 2004 
SCC 44 at para 38.
“In my opinion, under s. 88(1) an accused who otherwise 
satisfies the requirements of the offence should be 
excused from criminal liability where the possession of a 
weapon is necessary for defending himself.  The usual 
limits on the common law defence of necessity apply.  
First, the defence of necessity is limited to situations of 
clear and imminent peril. Thus, necessity would not 
excuse the possession of a weapon simply because the 
accused lived in a high-crime neighbourhood or finds 
himself among a dangerous prison population.  Second, 
the act must be unavoidable in that the circumstances 
afford the accused no reasonable opportunity for a legal 
way out, such as escaping or seeking police protection.  
Finally, the harm inflicted must be less than the harm 
sought to be avoided.”  - Supreme Court of Canada, Justice 
Lebel in R. v. Kerr, 2004 SCC 44 at para 94.
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Further, the accused, who was a then-incarcerated 
offender, feared for his personal safety if he were to 
testify. He was charged with attempting  to obstruct 
justice under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found that the accused had not 
refused to testify for the purpose of 
derailing  the criminal proceedings against 
the a l leged impai red dr iver. He 
concluded that the Crown had failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the 
specific intent to obstruct, pervert or defeat the 
course of justice based on the evidence. The 
accused was acquitted.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the acquittal 
suggesting  that the accused 
intended not to testify and the only 
inference available from this was 
that he intended to obstruct, pervert or defeat the 
course of justice. The Crown also contended that the 
trial judge conflated motive and intent and therefore 
improperly concluded that a specific intent to 
obstruct had not been proven. In its view, the 
accused’s desire to preserve his own safety, while 
motivating  his refusal to testify, did not negate his 
intent to obstruct justice. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s arguments. 
“The offence of attempting  to obstruct justice 
pursuant to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code is a 
substantive offence and one of specific intent,” said 
Justice Caldwell for the unanimous Court of Appeal. 
“The Crown must also prove that [the accused] 
subjectively intended to obstruct, pervert or defeat 
the course of justice.” So although there was no 
doubt the accused committed the actus reus of the 
offence under s. 139(2), the mens rea required proof 
on an intention to obstruct justice, not just an 
intention to do an act that had the effect of 
obstructing  justice. The trial judge acknowledged the 
accused’s likely motive for refusing  to testify (fear for 
his safety) but had a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the accused had the specific intent to obstruct the 
course of justice by refusing  to testify. The trial judge 
understood the subjective nature of the mens rea for 
s. 139(2) and did not err. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE PERSON WOULD 
BELIEVE NO CHOICE BUT TO 
COOPERATE: DETENTION FLOWS
R. v. Berner, 2012 BCCA 466
On a warm, clear, sunny day the 
accused drove her vehicle into a car 
parked on the shoulder of a road and 
then struck a woman and a four year 
old child standing  nearby feeding  a 
horse. The child was killed, the woman seriously 
injured and the occupants of the parked car received 
minor injuries. The road was straight and flat and 
visibility was good. Local residents helped the 
accused out of her vehicle and escorted her across 
the street where she sat down on the curb. A 
bystander pointed out the accused as the driver to 
one of the first police officers to arrive just after 5:00 
pm. The officer briefly spoke to the accused. She 
said her car veered out of control, left the road and 
careened into the parked car and the people 
standing  off the roadway. Despite not smelling 
alcohol, the officer asked the accused if she had 
anything  to drink prior to driving  because there was 
no apparent cause to the accident. The accused 
answered no. The officer, wanting  to speak to other 
witnesses, told the accused to “stay there, I’ll be 
back.” At 5:10 pm the officer decided to move the 
accused to the backseat of her police vehicle 
because (1) it would be more comfortable waiting  in 
the air-conditioned police car and she would be 
more easily located for medical attention, (2) it was 
safer as emergency vehicles moved about the scene 
and (3) she could be interviewed about the cause of 
the accident. 
The officer placed her hand in the small of the 
accused’s back, assisted her to stand and escorted 
her to the police vehicle by safely steering  her 
around emergency equipment. The officer opened 
the police car’s rear door and told the accused to 
have a seat. The officer closed the door and then 
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assisted air ambulances landing. At 5:25 pm the 
officer returned to the police car, opened the door, 
pulled out an audio recorder and took a two-minute 
statement, asking  several questions. No odour of 
liquor was detected and the officer had to attend to 
another duty. She closed the rear door again and 
returned at 5:40 pm, this time asking  the accused 
whether she had consumed any alcohol at all that 
day. She said she had consumed two glasses of wine 
at 2:00 pm.  The officer immediately formed the 
suspicion that the accused had alcohol in her body 
at the time of the accident, gave the approved 
screening  device (ASD) demand at 5:44 pm and 
took a sample of breath, which resulted in a fail 
reading. The officer then formed a belief that the 
accused had operated her motor vehicle within the 
previous three hours while impaired by alcohol. She 
was assessed by paramedics, then arrested at 5:52 
pm and advised her of her right to counsel under s. 
10(b) of the Charter. A breath demand followed at 
5:55 pm and, after accessing  counsel at 7:30 pm, 
the accused provided two breath samples at 7:58 
pm and 8:21 pm of 60 mg% and 40 mg% 
respectively. She was subsequently released without 
charge but, following  further investigation, was 
charged with impaired and dangerous driving 
causing  death and impaired and dangerous driving 
causing bodily harm. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The trial judge admitted as evidence the 
accused’s statement made to the officer 
while in the police vehicle that she had 
consumed two glasses of wine at 2:00 
pm that day. The judge concluded that there was no 
detention, either physically or psychologically, until 
the roadside demand was read and therefore no 
requirement for giving  her rights under s. 10(b). In 
any event, the questions asked were part of a “pre 
screening” process and the answers about alcohol 
consumption were only admissible to prove the 
grounds for the officer’s suspicion. 
The officer testified she would not have suspected 
the presence of alcohol absent this admission of 
consumption. The officer never detected an odour of 
alcohol on the accused, never observed difficulty in 
her walking, talking, or producing  identification and 
her eyes were not red or watery. The officer’s 
suspicion was grounded on the temporal proximity 
between the admitted consumption, the collision 
and the absence of any obvious explanation for it. 
The judge found that the admission of consuming 
two glasses of wine three hours before the accident 
along  with her apparent poor driving  were sufficient 
to provide the officer with a reasonable suspicion to 
give the ASD demand. The Crown called other 
witnesses, including  an expert in breathalyzer 
testing, and the accused was convicted.   
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
things, that the statement she made 
about consuming  the two glasses 
of wine was inadmissible. In her 
view, when she was placed in the police car she was 
detained (both physically and psychologically). This 
detention was both arbitrary and required that she 
be advised of her right to counsel under s. 10(b) 
before questioning. She contended that the 
statement, which was used by the officer to 
formulate a suspicion that she had alcohol in her 
body and led and to the subsequent ASD fail, should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).
Detention
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the 
accused was physically detained since she wanted 
to leave the police car but could not do so because 
the doors were locked.  This was a finding  of fact 
made by the trial judge which was entitled to 
deference. However, the Court of Appeal concluded 
the accused was psychologically detained. A 
reasonable person in her circumstances would 
conclude by reason of the officer’s conduct that 
there was no choice but to comply with going  to the 
police car and cooperating  in the investigation. 
Justice Ryan, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
stated:
I am not persuaded that the trial judge fully 
examined the question of detention from the 
aspect of a person in [ the accused’s] 
position. [The accused], the driver, was the only 
person on the scene to be taken to the police car 
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to await medical care. While in the vehicle [the 
officer] told [the accused] that she would be 
taking a recorded statement from her.  [The 
officer] took out her recorder and began her 
interview while standing outside the passenger 
door to the vehicle.  The trial judge considered 
the questions [the officer] asked to be “of a 
general nature”. They were, in the sense that the 
officer was attempting to find out what had 
caused the accident. However, the officer began 
her interview with [the accused] by identifying 
the file number attached to the investigation and 
then asked [the accused] to tell her what had 
h a p p e n e d w h i l e s h e r e c o r d e d t h e 
conversation.  It seems to me that if the trial 
judge had asked what a reasonable person in 
[the accused’s] position would make of the 
situation, he would have reached the conclusion 
that the reasonable person would believe that he 
or she was required to co-operate with the 
police and answer the questions. [para. 65]
Right to Counsel
Where a police officer reasonably suspects that a 
driver has alcohol in their body and has driven 
within the preceding  three hours, the officer may 
make a demand pursuant to s. 254(2) of the Criminal 
Code. When this demand is made, the driver is 
detained within the meaning  of ss. 9 and 10(b) of the 
Charter but the driver is not entitled to be advised of 
their rights before they provide a breath sample. This 
suspension of the right to counsel is a reasonable 
limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 due to the 
operational requirements of the roadside screening 
provisions under s. 254(2).  A failure on a roadside 
screening  test will then provide grounds for a 
breathalyzer demand under s. 254(3). But the 
question asked in this case was not part of the pre-
screening  process. Instead it was to further the 
accident investigation. Justice Ryan put it this way:
[I]f [the officer] had arrived on the scene of the 
accident and had immediately found [the 
accused] to be exhibiting signs of intoxication, it 
would have been within the scope of her duties 
to make inquiries of [the accused’s] alcohol 
consumption and to make the roadside 
screening demand without advising [the 
accused] of her right to counsel.
In the case at bar, the police officer only 
developed the grounds to reasonably suspect 
that the [accused] had alcohol in her body when 
[she] answered the officer’s questions in the 
police car at least half an hour after she had 
accompanied the officer to the car.  Thus the 
initial engagement of [the accused] was not in 
the context of a roadside screening demand, but 
as part of [the officer’s] investigation of the 
accident. [paras. 53-54]
Since the accused was psychologically detained, she 
should have been advised of her right to counsel 
before the tape recorded statement was taken. 
Admissibility
Despite the Charter breach, the Court of Appeal 
admitted the accused’s statement of alcohol 
consumption for the purposes of the determining 
whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
demand a roadside screening  test. In turn, the trial 
judge did not err in finding  that the officer’s 
subjectively held suspicion that the accused had 
alcohol in her body at the time of accident was 
objectively justified. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and her 
conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[T]he police officer only developed the grounds to reasonably suspect that the [accused] 
had alcohol in her body when [she] answered the officer’s questions in the police car at 
least half an hour after she had accompanied the officer to the car. Thus the initial 
engagement of [the accused] was not in the context of a roadside screening demand, but 
as part of [the officer’s] investigation of the accident.”
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REASONABLE SUSPICION 
STANDARD IS LOW: ROADSIDE 
DEMAND REASONABLE 
R. v. Ishmael, 2012 ABCA 282
 
After the accused was involved in a 
motor vehicle collision he called the 
police. He told the investigating 
officer that he had a beer with dinner 
about 4½ hours earlier. The officer 
read the roadside screening  demand under s. 254(2) 
of the Criminal Code, but the accused unsuccessfully 
attempted to provide a sample. He was charged with 
failing to comply with a demand. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The officer testified that the accused 
staggered when he walked and had a 
strong  smell of alcohol on his breath but 
this evidence was rejected. The judge 
concluded that the only evidence supporting  the 
officer’s suspicion was the accused’s admission of 
consuming  a beer approximately 4½ hours before 
the accident. This, the judge ruled, was insufficient 
to ground a reasonable suspicion of alcohol in the 
body. Although the officer subjectively had a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol 
in his body, there was no objective basis for that 
belief. The accused was acquitted of failing  to 
provide a breath sample. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown successfully appealed the 
acquittal, arguing  that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that an admission of 
alcohol consumption was an insufficient 
objective basis for a reasonable suspicion that the 
accused had alcohol in his body. “In my view, the 
authorities have also established that an admission 
of alcohol consumption, at least in circumstances of 
the nature before the learned trial judge, is sufficient 
to support a reasonable suspicion of alcohol in 
someone’s body without requiring  investigation into 
timing, quantity, or behavioural effects,” said the 
appeal judge. However, he also found it unnecessary 
to determine how long  since the last drink would 
render this proposition an absurdity. The accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a conviction was 
entered. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused then applied for leave to 
appeal from the Court of Queen’s Bench 
decision. He  questioned whether an 
admission to the recent consumption of 
alcohol was sufficient to ground a reasonable 
suspicion that an accused has alcohol in their body 
within the meaning  of s. 254(2) to the preclusion of 
other objective factors including  the temporal 
element of the recent consumption. 
Justice Rowbothan denied leave to appeal, finding 
the law was well settled in this area. Section 254(2) 
permits a police officer to make a roadside breath 
demand if the officer reasonably suspects that a 
driver has alcohol in their body and has driven 
within the preceding  three hours. Reasonable 
suspicion has both a subjective and objective 
component. As for the objective component, Justice 
Rowbothan stated:
The law on this issue is well settled. ... [A]n 
admission of consumption of alcohol is 
sufficient to meet the objective part of the test 
under s 254(2). It is unnecessary to analyze the 
behavioural consequences. Numerous Court of 
Queen’s Bench decisions have ... found that 
other evidence about timing or amount of 
consumption need not be pursued to support 
this proposition.
This line of cases confirms that the threshold of 
reasonable suspicion under s 254(2) is low. 
Police officers should not be required to enter 
into expert-type analyses regarding how much 
alcohol would be in a person’s body based on 
the amounts and timing  of the consumption. 
“[T]he threshold of reasonable suspicion under s 254(2) is low. Police officers should not 
be required to enter into expert-type analyses regarding how much alcohol would be in a 
person’s body based on the amounts and timing of the consumption.”
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There are simply too many factors which can 
affect these conclusions including  a person’s 
height, weight, food consumption, size of drink, 
and alcohol concentration. Furthermore, 
entering into this type of questioning  would only 
prolong and complicate the episode of detention 
and potential search imposed upon motorists. 
[references omitted, paras. 11-12]
Justice Rowbotham concluded that the appeal judge 
correctly followed the law.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LAW RESPECTING ARRIVING 
TRAVELLERS APPLIES TO 
PEOPLE LEAVING CANADA 
R. v. Nagle, 2012 BCCA 373
 
The accused checked her luggage at 
the Vancouver’s International Airport, 
passed through security and waited in 
the international departures lounge to 
board a flight for Japan. At 12:13 pm 
a roving  Border Services Officer asked her to step 
aside from a lineup and place her purse on a shelf. 
He had positioned himself behind an airline 
employee who was checking  passengers’ boarding 
passes and identification. The officer had seen the 
accused present her documents and he wanted to 
determine whether she had complied with the 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist 
Financing Act (PCMLTFA). The PCMLTFA requires 
persons departing  Canada to report if they are in 
possession of currency valued at $10,000 or more. 
She said she only had $1,200 with her and that’s all 
the officer found when he searched her purse. While 
searching, he continued to ask various questions 
about her ticketing, routing, occupation and travel 
plans. As a result of her answers, the officer became 
suspicious that she might be trafficking in drugs. 
At 12:18 pm he told her that she was detained and 
advised her of the right to silence and her s. 10(b) 
Charter right to retain and instruct counsel, 
including  the availability of duty counsel. The 
accused confirmed that she understood but did not 
wish to speak to lawyer.  She was removed from the 
flight and her luggage was taken off the airplane. 
She was escorted to the secondary examination area 
where an x-ray of her suitcases revealed just over 
one kilogram of concealed methamphetamine 
concealed. A $500 Western Union receipt with the 
last name of a person reputedly involved in criminal 
gang  activities was also found in her purse. The 
accused was arrested and again advised of her right 
to counsel. She spoke to duty counsel and a 
personal search under s. 8  of the Customs Act (CA) 
followed, but nothing  more was found. She was 
charged with possessing  methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking  and possession for the purpose 
of exportation from Canada under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The trial judge determined that the 
accused’s Charter rights had been 
violated. He found she had been 
psychologically detained when the border 
services officer made the request for her to step 
aside and put her purse on the shelf. At that point 
she was under his direction and control and should 
have been advised of her rights under ss. 10(a) and 
(b). However, she was not advised of these rights 
until after she had given incriminating  answers that 
led to the formation of the officer’s reasonable 
BY THE BOOK:
S. 16(2): Proceeds of Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act
An officer may, in order to determine 
whether there are, in baggage, 
currency or monetary instruments that 
are of a value equal to or greater than 
the amount prescribed for the purpose 
of subsection 12(1) and that have not been 
reported in accordance with that subsection, 
search the baggage, examine anything  in it and 
open or cause to be opened any package or 
container in it and direct that the baggage be 
moved to a customs office or other suitable place 
for the search, examination or opening.
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suspicion. The judge also concluded this 
detention was arbitrary. Furthermore, the 
judge called the search a “trolling 
expedition.” Since the search of the luggage 
resulted from the information obtained in 
violation of her Charter  rights, the luggage 
search was also unreasonable. The evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted. 
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
      
The Crown argued that the accused 
was not detained under the Charter 
when she was asked to step aside 
and place her purse on the shelf. In 
its view, the accused was detained for constitutional 
purposes only when she was formally advised of 
such and steps were taken to remove her luggage 
from the airplane. Prior to that point, the Crown 
submitted that the accused was merely subjected to 
the permissible routine border screening  processes 
which do not engage ss. 9 or 10 of the Charter. 
Further, s. 8 was not engaged when her purse was 
searched because she did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy as an international traveller at 
a border crossing. In any event, the examination of 
the purse was authorized by the PCMLTFA and there 
were reasonable grounds to support a luggage 
search under s. 99(1)(e) and (f) of the CA. 
Border Context
Justices Chiasson and Bennett, writing  the Court of 
Appeal’s opinion, first found that the law respecting 
the detention and search of travelers applicable to 
those “entering” Canada also applied to those 
“leaving” Canada. They concluded that “the liberty 
interest and expectation of privacy of travellers is 
reduced at border crossings regardless whether they 
are arriving, in-transit or departing.” Thus, routine 
screening  procedures, such as questioning  and 
searching  baggage, equally apply to enforcing  the 
law with respect to passengers leaving  Canada 
without engaging  constitutional rights as they do to 
those arriving  in or in transit through Canada. The 
application of this general principle, however, will 
be determined on a case-by-case basis since 
circumstances will vary.
Detention?
When the accused was initially stopped and 
questioned she had not been detained in the 
constitutional sense. This was merely part of routine 
screening  procedures by border officials. “[The 
officer’s] questions and investigation had not yet 
gone beyond routine screening  procedures in a way 
that would engage [the accused’s] constitutional 
rights,” said the Court of Appeal. Since she was not 
detained there was no obligation for the officer to 
inform her of her right to counsel.
Purse Search 
The officer’s initial questioning  and examination of 
the purse was to determine whether she was 
required to file a report under the PCMLTFA.  The 
search of the purse was a routine search and, in the 
context of crossing  a border, again part of the 
routine screening  procedure.  An international 
traveller has a significantly reduced expectation of 
privacy and has no constitutional right to be free 
from the search of bags, purses, luggage or a pat 
down when they decide to cross a border. 
Furthermore, the officer was also authorized to 
examine the contents of the purse under s. 16(2) of 
the PCMLTFA. The search of the accused’s purse was 
not a s. 8 breach. The Court of Appeal concluded:
In our view, prior to formally detaining and 
advising her of her rights, [the officer] did not 
violate [the accused’s] Charter rights by 
questioning her and looking  through her purse.  
With the information at hand it was reasonable 
for him to detain her and for her luggage to be 
searched. The evidence to support that detention 
and the search and the evidence found as a 
result of the search was admissible. [para. 79]
And further it added:
Border crossings are not Charter-free zones.  
Border officials must be alive to the rights of 
travellers under Canadian law. While border 
“Border crossings are not Charter-free zones.  
Border officials must be alive to the rights of 
travellers under Canadian law.”
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officials have a right to make routine inquiries as 
part of the screening  process, once border 
officials have “assumed control over the 
movement of [a traveller] by a demand that had 
significant legal consequences” the person is 
detained and must be apprised of his or her 
rights and afforded an opportunity to contact 
counsel.  At that point, constitutional rights are 
fully engaged. [reference omitted, para. 81]
Since there were no Charter breaches, there was no 
need to conduct an admissibility analysis under s. 
24(2). The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc  
VIOLENCE OCCURRED AFTER 
THEFT COMPLETE: 
s.343(a) ROBBERY NOT PROVEN
R. v. Jean, 2012 BCCA 448
While a man was withdrawing  $40 
from his account in an ATM cubicle, 
the accused reached across, grabbed 
the two $20s as they dropped out 
from the machine and made a run 
for the door. The man blocked the door and a 
struggle ensued. He brought the accused back inside 
the cubicle, hitting  him three or four times with his 
fist.  The accused tried unsuccessfully to strike the 
man back. Police arrived and arrested the accused, 
who was found clutching  $40 in his hand when he 
was booked into jail. He was charged with robbery 
under s. 343(a) of the Criminal Code.
British Columbia Provincial Court
At trial a series of photographs taken by a 
video surveillance camera at the ATM 
enclosure was used as evidence, along 
with the witness, police and jail guard 
testimony. The judge concluded that the accused’s 
action fell squarely within the definition of robbery 
under s. 343(a), which reads, “Everyone commits 
robbery who (a)  steals, and for the purpose of 
extorting  whatever is stolen or to prevent or 
overcome resistance to the stealing, uses violence or 
threats of violence to a person or property.” He was 
convicted.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
there was no evidence that he used 
violence or a threat of violence for 
the purpose o f overcoming 
resistance to the theft. In his view, when the victim 
turned around and tried to recover the money the 
theft was complete. Any force or violence he then 
used was for the purposes of effecting  escape, not 
for the purposes of effecting  the theft or overcoming 
resistance to the theft. He submitted that the 
violence under s. 343(a) is limited to the time of the 
stealing, not afterwards. The Crown, on the other 
hand, suggested that the accused used a threat of 
violence in an effort to complete the theft he had 
begun when he seized the money. The Crown saw 
the activity in the ATM enclosure as one continuing 
transaction.
Chief Justice Finch, delivering  the Court of Appeal 
judgement, agreed with the accused. Under s. 343, 
robbery may be committed in one of four ways. 
Here, the accused was charged under s. 343(a). 
“Robbery within the meaning  of s. 343(a) therefore 
requires the use of violence or threats of violence in 
the course of, and for the purpose of, taking 
whatever it is that is being  stolen,” said Chief Justice 
Finch.  “In other words, the violence or threat must 
occur before or contemporaneously with the theft.” 
The Court of Appeal found the “theft” was complete 
at the time the victim tried to stop the accused from 
leaving  the ATM enclosure. Thus, whatever force the 
accused used was not to “prevent or overcome” the 
“Robbery within the meaning of 
s. 343(a) ... requires the use of violence or 
threats of violence in the course of, and for 
the purpose of, taking whatever it is that is 
being stolen. In other words, the violence 
or threat must occur before or 
contemporaneously with the theft.”
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victim’s resistance to the stealing, but to carry out an 
escape after the theft had already occurred. Section 
343(b), on the other hand, refers specifically to the 
use of violence either immediately before or 
immediately after the theft. The Crown, however, did 
not charge under s. 343(b). In finding  there was no 
evidence support the robbery as charged under s. 
343(a), Chief Justice Finch stated:
The fact that the physical exchange between [the 
victim] and the [accused] occurred within a very 
short time after the money was taken does not 
bring the theft within the ambit of s. 343(a) so as 
to constitute robbery. The money was stolen 
without the use of violence or threats.  [The 
victim] had no opportunity to resist the stealing 
because he was taken completely unawares.  His 
use of force, and the [accused’s] response, came 
in the course of [the victim’s] attempting  to 
prevent the [accused’] escape. [para. 42]
The accused’s appeal was allowed and a conviction 
for the included offence of theft under $5,000 was 
substituted.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc  
RANDOM STOP IN PRIVATE 
PARKING AREA ARBITRARY
R. v. Lux, 2012 SKCA 129
Two police officers on routine patrol 
randomly stopped a vehicle in a 
private parking  area adjacent to a 
hotel. They wanted to check for the 
driver’s licence and vehicle registration. The driver 
was escorted to the police car and asked some 
questions, including  whether she had recently 
consumed any alcohol. After she said she had, an 
officer advised her that he suspected she had 
alcohol in her body and demanded a sample of her 
breath under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code for 
analysis into a roadside screening  device. The 
accused went through the motions of providing  a 
sample but failed to produce a suitable one. She was 
charged with failing provide a breath sample.  
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge concluded that Saskatchewan’s 
Traffic Safety Act (TSA), including  s. 
209.1, did not apply to private parking 
areas and, therefore, “the police did not 
have authority to detain and question the motorist.” 
The police breached the accused’s s. 9 Charter right 
to be free from arbitrary detention and the evidence 
obtained that would otherwise justify a legal 
demand for a roadside breath sample was excluded 
under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
On appeal by Crown, a Queen’s Bench 
judge ruled that s. 209.1 does authorize a 
peace officer to conduct a random stop in 
a private parking  area and require the 
detained driver to provide information concerning 
their sobriety. “There is no limitation found in s. 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 343 Criminal Code: Robbery
Every one commits robbery who
(a) steals, and for the purpose of 
extorting  whatever is stolen or to 
prevent or overcome resistance 
to the stealing, uses violence or 
threats of violence to a person or 
property;
(b)  steals from any person and, at the time he 
steals or immediately before or immediately 
thereafter, wounds, beats, strikes or uses any 
personal violence to that person;
(c) assaults any person with intent to steal from 
him; or
(d) steals from any person while armed with an 
offensive weapon or imitation thereof.
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209.1 as to where a motor vehicle must be operating 
before it can be stopped, only that it is being 
operated,” said the appeal judge. “In my opinion, 
the object of the legislation was to reduce or prevent 
accidents caused by drinking  and driving.” The 
accused’s detention did not infringe s. 9. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal 
was set aside and the matter sent back to Provincial 
Court for a new trial.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged the 
Queen’s Bench ruling, arguing  s. 
209.1 did not authorize peace 
officers to randomly stop and 
detain a driver operating  a vehicle on a private 
parking  area for the purpose of checking  for a 
driver’s licence, vehicle registration or driver 
sobriety. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed, 
finding  the Queen’s Bench judge misinterpreted s. 
209.1. 
“In my view, s. 209.1 falls far short of establishing  by 
clear words or clear implication that peace officers 
are entitled to conduct random stops anywhere on 
private property used as a parking  area, where there 
is no basis to believe the driver is committing  any 
infraction or poses a threat to public safety, or 
evidence or reason to believe that peace officers 
would be significantly hampered in performing  their 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 209.1 Saskatchewan's Highway Safety Act
Authority of peace officer to stop  and request 
information
209.1(1)  A peace officer may 
require the person in charge of or 
operating  a motor vehicle to stop 
that vehicle if the peace officer:
(a)  is readily identifiable as a 
peace officer; and
(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties 
and responsibilities.
(2)  A peace officer may, at any time when a 
driver is stopped pursuant to subsection (1):
(a)  require the driver to give his or her name, 
date of birth and address;
(b)  request information from the driver about 
whether and to what extent the driver 
consumed, before or while driving, alcohol or 
any drug  or other substance that causes the 
driver to be unable to safely operate a vehicle; 
and
(c)   if the peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the driver has consumed alcohol 
or a drug  or another substance that causes the 
driver to be unable to safely operate a vehicle, 
require the driver to undergo a field sobriety 
test.
(3)  No person in charge of or operating  a motor 
vehicle shall, when signaled or requested to 
stop by a peace officer pursuant to subsection 
(1), fail to immediately bring  the vehicle to a 
safe stop.
(4)  No person in charge of or operating  a motor 
vehicle shall fail, when requested by a peace 
officer, to comply with the requests of a peace 
officer pursuant to subsection (2).
“s. 209.1 falls far short of establishing by 
clear words or clear implication that peace 
officers are entitled to conduct random 
stops anywhere on private property used 
as a parking area, where there is no basis 
to believe the driver is committing any 
infraction or poses a threat to public 
safety, or evidence or reason to believe 
that peace officers would be significantly 
hampered in performing their duties if they 
waited until a vehicle exited from a private 
parking area onto a highway.”
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duties if they waited until a vehicle exited from a 
private parking  area onto a highway,” said Chief 
Justice Klebuc, speaking  for the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal. “In sum, I conclude that s. 209.1 does not 
authorize peace officers to conduct random stops for 
traffic safety purposes on private parking  areas. 
Consequently, the subject random stop constituted 
an arbitrary detention that infringed the [accused’s] 
s. 9 rights.” 
The Court of Appeal, in looking  at all of the factors 
under s. 24(2), also excluded the conscripted 
evidence obtained by police during  the accused’s 
detention. Although the officer “did not act in bad 
faith, he ought to have known that he was not 
entitled to detain the [accused] and check for a 
driver’s licence or vehicle registration, neither of 
which was required to operate a vehicle off highway 
on a private parking  area,” said Chief Justice Klebuc. 
Furthermore, there was nothing  unusual about the 
accused’s driving. The officer could have waited 
until she drove onto a highway if that is what the 
accused chose. In balancing  these factors, along 
with others, the Court of Appeal found the nature of 
the breaches and the manner in which they infringed 
on the accused’s privacy and freedom outweighed 
the interests of the public in having  a trial on its 
merits. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence was 
excluded and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case at www.canlii.org
Meaning of “Highway”
It is important to note that the meaning  of “highway” 
in some provincial traffic legislation does not 
include private parking  areas while in some 
provinces it is included.
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act 
excludes private parking  areas 
within the meaning of a “highway”:
“highway” means a road, parkway, driveway, 
square or place designed and intended for or 
used by the general public for the passage of 
vehicles, but does not include any area, whether 
privately or publicly owned, that is primarily 
intended to be used for the parking of vehicles 
and the necessary passageways on that area.
Compare that to Alberta’s Traffic 
Safety Act which includes private 
parking  areas within the meaning  of 
highway:
“highway” means any thoroughfare, street, road, 
trail, avenue, parkway, driveway, viaduct, lane, 
alley, square, bridge, causeway, trestleway or 
other place or any part of any of them, whether 
publicly or privately owned, that the public is 
ordinarily entitled or permitted to use for the 
passage or parking of vehicles ... 
In British Columbia, the meaning  of 
highway is defined in s. 1 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act. It too, like 
Alberta, appears to include private parking areas: 
"highway" includes
(a)  every highway within the meaning of the 
Transportation Act,
(b)  every road, street, lane or right of way 
designed or intended for or used by the general 
public for the passage of vehicles, and
(c) every private place or passageway to which 
the public, for the purpose of the parking or 
servicing of vehicles, has access or is invited,
but does not include an industrial road.
Note-able Quote
“Coming together is a beginning; keeping 
together is progress; working together is 
success.” - Henry Ford
“s. 209.1 does not authorize peace officers to conduct random stops for traffic safety 
purposes on private parking areas. Consequently, the subject random stop constituted an 
arbitrary detention that infringed the [accused’s] s. 9 rights”
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UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR 
SUPPORTS IMPAIRMENT 
INTERPRETATION
R. v. Startup, 2012 ABCA 356
The accused was involved in a single 
vehicle accident after leaving  a 
neighborhood pub. The pick-up truck 
he was driving  veered out of control 
on the snowy and icy roads, crossed 
the opposite lane of travel, and smashed head-long 
into a cement block retaining  wall. A passenger in 
his vehicle, who was not wearing  his seatbelt, was 
seriously injured when his head struck the 
windshield. After the collision the accused walked 
back to his residence and the police were called. He 
was charged with several offences including 
impaired driving causing bodily harm. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The Crown’s principal witness was the 
accused’s passenger. He testified that the 
accused consumed alcohol over the 
course of the evening  and that he had 
danced alone at the pub when no one else was 
dancing, was loud and arrogant, was getting  in other 
people’s faces and making  a fool of himself. He also 
said the accused’s driving  was “erratic”, “with no 
concern to anybody”, “fish-tailing” and “all over the 
road.” He claimed the accused was speeding 
excessively and over-steering, which led to the fish-
tailing. The trial judge noted that there was an 
absence of physical indicia of impairment, such as 
an odour of alcohol on the accused’s breath, 
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, diminished motor 
skills, or other signs of impairment generally relied 
upon by police officers who testify in such 
prosecutions. But there was evidence of the 
accused’s abnormal behaviour that the judge found 
could only be attributed to impairment by alcohol. 
As the judge observed, there was “no external 
evidence, other than the ability of the Accused being 
impaired by alcohol, that could explain the 
Accused’s manner of driving, and collision that 
resulted in the [passenger] sustaining  serious bodily 
harm.” He was convicted, among  other crimes, of 
impaired driving causing bodily harm. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that his 
“obnoxious” behaviour - being  loud 
and loathsome - was consistent 
with a character flaw and other 
rational explanations other than impairment by 
alcohol. In his view, the trial judge erred in finding 
that his abnormal behaviour could only be attributed 
to his impairment by alcohol. But the Court of 
Appeal rejected this contention:
There can be no doubt that the unusual 
behaviour of the [accused] at the pub would 
impress upon the reasonable person that the 
[accused] was drunk. The indicia of the 
[accused’s] impairment in this case is in many 
ways no different than the indicia generally 
relied upon by law enforcement and the courts 
in that which can be described as the “usual” 
impaired driving  case, namely, bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech, lack of balance, etc. Such factors 
are, of course, capable of more than one 
interpretation, but absent evidence to the 
contrary, may properly be relied upon to found a 
conviction when married to other indicia of 
impairment, such as fish-tailing, speeding and 
collision. Put another way, such uncontradicted 
evidence does not command appellate 
interference. In context, it is the only reasonable 
inference to draw. [para. 9]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“There can be no doubt that the unusual behaviour of the [accused] at the pub would 
impress upon the reasonable person that the [accused] was drunk. ... Such factors are, of 
course, capable of more than one interpretation, but absent evidence to the contrary, may 
properly be relied upon to found a conviction when married to other indicia of impairment, 
such as fish-tailing, speeding and collision.”
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ARREST GROUNDS REQUIRES 
MORE THAN REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OR HUNCH
R. v. Shinkewski, 2012 SKCA 63
After a previously reliable informant 
provided a tip to police that a 
shipment of cocaine and marihuana 
would arrive at a residence on a 
specific day, the police set up 
surveillance on the home. After some activity was 
observed involving  a few vehicles arriving  at the 
home and then leaving, the sergeant in charge of the 
investigation believed the anticipated drug  delivery 
had been carried out. Later, police saw two vehicles 
arrive at the residence and depart shortly thereafter. 
Then, a third vehicle registered to the accused 
arrived, stayed for about four minutes and left. The 
sergeant was aware that the accused had been 
implicated by three previous informants in 
marihuana trafficking, but he did not know the 
specific details, currency or reliability of these tips. 
Nevertheless, the sergeant, on the basis of the latest 
informant’s tip and other known information, 
believed he had reasonable grounds to believe the 
operator of the accused’s vehicle had taken 
possession of a controlled substance. He directed 
the surveillance team to stop the vehicle, arrest its 
occupants for possession of a controlled substance 
and search them and the vehicle for drug  evidence. 
The vehicle was stopped, the accused was arrested 
for possession of a controlled substance, and police 
found four one-half pound bags of marihuana in the 
vehicle. The accused was charged with possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused challenged the admissibility 
of the marihuana, arguing  he was 
unlawfully arrested and therefore his s. 9 
Charter right to be free from arbitrary 
detention was violated. Furthermore, he submitted 
that the search incident to that unlawful arrest was 
also a Charter breach under s. 8  (unreasonable 
search). The judge found that the sergeant arguably 
possessed reasonable grounds to suspect criminal 
activity but not reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused had committed an indictable offence. 
Therefore, the arrest under s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code was unlawful. The search of the 
vehicle incident to that unlawful arrest was 
unreasonable and the marihuana was excluded as 
evidence under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal contending  the trial judge 
erred in ruling  that the sergeant did 
not have reasonable grounds to 
make the arrest under s. 495. Then, if the arrest was 
lawful, a search incidental to that arrest would be 
reasonable and therefore no s. 8 breach would flow. 
Arrest
The police may arrest a person without a warrant 
under s. 495(1)(a) if the arresting  officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the subject of arrest 
has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence. This is a mandatory condition precedent to 
a valid exercise of the s. 495(1)(a) arrest power. 
Justice Caldwell, authoring  the unanimous 
judgment, described the “reasonable grounds to 
believe” standard as follows:
(a) an arresting officer must subjectively hold 
reasonable grounds to arrest and those 
grounds must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view – in other words, a 
reasonable person placed in the position of 
the arresting officer must be able to 
conclude there were indeed reasonable 
grounds for the arrest;
(b) an arresting officer is not required to 
establish the commission of an indictable 
offence on a balance of probabilities or a 
prima facie case for conviction before 
making  the arrest; but an arresting  officer 
must act on something more than a 
“reasonable suspicion” or a hunch;
(c) an arresting officer must consider all 
incriminating and exonerating information 
which the circumstances reasonably permit, 
but may disregard information which the 
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officer has reason to believe may be 
unreliable;
(d) a reviewing court must view the evidence 
available to an arresting officer cumulatively, 
not in a piecemeal fashion; and
(e) “…the standard must be interpreted 
contextual ly, having  regard to the 
circumstances in their entirety, including the 
timing involved, the events leading up to the 
arrest both immediate and over time, and 
the dynamics at play in the arrest”; and, 
context includes the experience and training 
of the arresting  officer. [references omitted, 
para. 9]
Further, it was important to note that the sergeant 
was not required to pause and confirm the details, 
currency or reliability of the information tying  the 
accused to the three previous marihuana trafficking 
instances. He was entitled to rely on his imperfect 
recollection. But, if he had reason to believe the tips 
were unreliable or stale-dated at the time he was 
determining  whether he had sufficient grounds for 
an arrest, he would have been required to disregard 
them or accord them less weight in his 
determination. As the Court stated:
[T]he standard of “reasonable grounds to 
believe” does not require that an arresting  officer 
ensure there has been “informed consideration” 
of all the information available at the time of 
arrest before the officer may lawfully effect an 
arrest. The standard simply requires the arresting 
officer to consider all incriminating  and 
e x o n e r a t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h t h e 
circumstances reasonably permit. [para. 16]
In this case, the accused was merely a target of 
opportunity. “The evolving  circumstances of the 
surveillance and arrests which flowed from it did not 
reasonably permit a prolonged investigation of the 
factors giving  rise to [the sergeant’s] determination 
that there were reasonable grounds to arrest the 
operator of [the accused’s] vehicle,” said Justice 
Caldwell. “Rather, the circumstances called for [the 
sergeant] to conduct a direct and honest assessment 
of all of the facts known to him at that time, whether 
incriminating  or exonerating.” Thus, a court must 
conduct “ i ts assessment of the object ive 
reasonableness of the grounds for arrest from the 
retrospective viewpoint of a reasonable person 
placed in the position of the arresting  officer. Where 
the circumstances of arrest do not reasonably permit 
the arresting  officer to inquire into the veracity of the 
information which formed the basis of the grounds 
for arrest, the law similarly does not permit judicial 
consideration of any evidentiary shortcomings which 
might come to light or be discovered post-arrest. An 
otherwise lawful arrest is not invalidated by the ex 
post facto discovery of deficiencies or defects in the 
information upon which the police have relied to 
effect the arrest unless, in the circumstances at play 
in the arrest situation, the police could reasonably 
have made inquiries which would have led to the 
discovery of the deficiencies or defects.” The trial 
judge erred by considering  an irrelevant factor (the 
actual reliability and currency of information was 
not known to the arresting  officer at the time of 
arrest) in assessing  the reasonableness of the grounds 
for arrest. The Court of Appeal found there were 
reasonable grounds to believe the accused had 
committed an indictable offence:
... I make the following observations from the 
jurisprudence:
(a) information from a reliable source informing 
of a forthcoming delivery of cocaine and 
marihuana to a specific individual at a 
specific residence at a specific time by a 
courier arriving from a specific city;
(b) the arrival of a vehicle consistent with the 
courier vehicle described by the informant at 
the identified residence on the day 
predicted, suggesting that the anticipated 
drug delivery had occurred;
(c) shortly thereafter, the arrival at the target 
residence of a number of vehicles, including 
one registered to [the accused], each of 
which remained for only a short period of 
time; behaviour which, in [the sergeant’s] 
experience as a drug investigator, was 
consistent with individuals picking up or 
purchasing drugs; and
(d) [the accused] had been named in three 
separate tips as someone involved in 
marihuana trafficking. 
While the list is short, the standard of 
“reasonable grounds to believe” is not met by 
the number of grounds articulated by the 
arresting  officer; rather, it is the cumulative 
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weight of the grounds articulated which, on an 
objective basis and when considered in context, 
must tilt the balance from “mere suspicion” to a 
“reasonable suspicion” and then to “reasonable 
grounds to believe” an individual has or is about 
to commit an indictable offence. [references 
omitted, paras. 20-21]
So, while the objective factors in this case were not 
overwhelming, the list of factors articulated by the 
sergeant were such that their constellation would 
cause a reasonable person, standing  in the sergeant’s 
shoes, to reasonably believe that the operator of the 
accused’s vehicle was unlawfully in possession of a 
controlled substance. The arrest was therefore 
lawful.
Search
Warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable. 
The police power to search incidental to arrest, 
however, is an established exception to this general 
rule. If the accused’s arrest was lawful - made in 
accordance with a lawful exercise of police power - 
the search of his vehicle would be reasonable. The 
accused conceded as much. Thus, the marihuana 
was admissible and there was no need to consider s. 
24(2). 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
OFFICER CAN RELY ON 
INFERENCES TO JUSTIFY FINDS 
COMMITTING ARREST
R. v. Boyd, 2013 BCCA 19
 
A police officer working  a roadblock 
screening  for impaired drivers 
stopped a car driven by the accused, 
its lone occupant. The officer, 
standing  next to the open driver’s 
door window, asked the accused if he had anything 
to drink that evening  and detected the smell of 
freshly burnt marihuana. He immediately placed the 
accused under arrest for possession of marihuana. 
The accused was searched and police found four 
small plastic baggies containing  0.5 grams of 
cocaine each and a cell phone. He was then 
arrested for possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and charged with that offence. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The officer testified that he had on 
several occasions previously smelled 
burnt marihuana which he described as a 
very distinctive smell, different from 
vegetative marihuana. He characterized the odour as 
strong, leading  him to believe it had been smoked 
within 15 minutes prior to the stop. The officer also 
said he had conducted at least 30 investigations 
during  traffic stops where he detected the odour of 
burnt or burning  marihuana and made many drug 
s e i z u r e s ( m a r i h u a n a a n d c o n t a m i n a t e d 
paraphernalia) incidental to arrest.
The trial judge found the accused’s arrest for 
possession of marihuana was unlawful. Possession of 
marihuana in these circumstances could only 
amount to a summary offence for which the officer 
would be required to find the offence being 
committed - s. 495(1)(b) Criminal Code: “A peace 
officer may arrest without warrant ... a person whom 
he finds committing a criminal offence.”
In the judge’s view, the smell of burnt marihuana 
alone was insufficient to justify the conclusion that 
the accused was in possession of marihuana at the 
time.  The officer did not see any marihuana nor did 
he see the accused engaged in any act from which 
actual possession could properly be inferred. “The 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the smell of 
burnt marihuana, whether one estimates the burning 
to have taken place in the immediate past or hours 
previously, is that the marihuana which was the 
source of that smell no longer exists,” said the judge.  
“It has been consumed by fire.  In my view, it would 
be unreasonable, as a matter of both law and logic, 
to draw an inference of present possession from 
nothing  more than evidence of past possession.” 
Since the arrest was unlawful, the search incident to 
that arrest was unreasonable under s. 8  of the 
Charter, the cocaine was excluded under s. 24(2), 
and the accused was acquitted. 
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crowns chal lenged the 
accused’s acquittal. The Court of 
Appeal first examined whether the 
power of arrest for a summary only 
offence requires an officer to actually see an offence 
being  committed or whether it is enough that an 
officer observes facts from which an inference may 
be drawn that an offence is being  committed. Justice 
Hall, delivering  the Appeal Court’s unanimous 
opinion, found an officer can rely on inferences 
arising from observed facts:
[I]t seems to me that a peace officer could 
legitimately arrest a person if it is apparent that 
an offence is being  committed by such 
person.  This requirement has both subjective 
and objective components.  A peace officer 
exercising the arrest power must provide some 
sensible reason for believing an offence was 
being committed by the person arrested. 
... I take the word “apparent” to require an 
objectively sensible apprehension by the 
arresting officer that an offence is being 
perpetrated by the person arrested. [paras. 6-7]
So in this case, was the odour of burnt marihuana by 
itself sufficient to provide a lawful basis for arrest 
under s. 495(1)(b)?  In answering  the question, the 
Court of Appeal made clear that all of the relevant 
circumstances must be considered. If those 
circumstances objectively support an inference that 
criminal activity is occurring, a judge will be entitled 
to find an arrest justifiable under s. 495(1)(b). Here, 
however, different judges could have reached 
different conclusions about the adequacy of the 
arrest since the grounds - burnt odour plus officer 
experience - were close to the line. The decision of 
the trial judge was therefore entitled to deference 
and the acquittal was upheld. 
The Court of Appeal also noted a difference between 
the odour of vegetative marihuana, which indicates 
the actual drug  substance is being  detected, and the 
odour of burnt marihuana, which merely indicates 
that some marihuana has been consumed by fire. 
Justice Hall also twice cited the case of R. v. 
Webster, 2008  BCCA 458  where it was stated that 
the odour of freshly-smoked marihuana emanating 
from a vehicle objectively supported, at a minimum, 
a reasonable suspicion that the driver and/or 
passenger were then engaged in possessing 
marihuana. So it appears that the dour of burnt 
marihuana will at least support an investigative 
detention. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
What The Judge Couldn’t Consider
Because the officer immediately arrested the accused 
upon smelling the odour of burnt marihuana, what 
followed the arrest could not be used as grounds to 
support it. 
After the accused was directed to move his vehicle 
to a parking lot a short distance away so as not to 
impede traffic, the officer noted he accelerated his 
vehicle more quickly than was necessary.  Once the 
vehicle was parked, the accused appeared to be 
moving around inside the vehicle very quickly “as if 
he were trying to conceal or attempting to retrieve 
something.” The officer described these movements 
as “not typical” of those by persons who are the 
subject of traffic stops and are trying to retrieve 
driver’s licences or other papers.
When the accused was told to get out of his vehicle, 
he put one hand into the hood of his jacket, a 
movement which caused the officer to believe he had 
put something into the hood. In fact, the hood was 
where the officer found the four plastic baggies 
containing cocaine.  - R. v. Boyd, 2011 BCPC 137
“[I]t seems to me that a peace officer could legitimately arrest a person if it is apparent that 
an offence is being committed by such person. This requirement has both subjective and 
objective components. A peace officer exercising the arrest power must provide some 
sensible reason for believing an offence was being committed by the person arrested.”
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The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide 
an opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers.
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank and 
this conference will provide delegates from the police 
community with an opportunity to engage in a variety of 
leadership areas. The Police Leadership Conference will 
bring together experts who will provide current, lively, and 
interesting topics on leadership. The carefully chosen list of 
keynote speakers will provide a first class opportunity at a 
first class venue to hear some of the world's outstanding 
authorities on leadership, the challenges facing the policing 
community and how to overcome those challenges.
The Service of Policing:               
Meeting Public Expectation
April 7 - 9, 2013
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Rick Mercer chronicles, satirizes and ultimately celebrates all that is great and irreverent about this 
country. Known as "Canada's Unofficial Opposition," Mercer is our most popular comic, a political 
satirist who knows exactly what matters to regular Canadians and what makes them laugh. Born in 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Mercer has won over 25 Gemini Awards.                                          
Clarence Joseph Louie, first elected as Chief of the Osoyoos Indian Band in December 1984, has 
consistently emphasized economic development as a means to improve his people’s standard of 
living. Under his direction (20+ years), the Band has become a multi-faceted corporation that owns 
and manages nine businesses and employs hundreds of people.
Craig Kielburger co-founded, with his brother Marc, Free The Children in 1995 at only 12 years of 
age. Today, he remains a passionate full-time volunteer for the organization, now an international 
charity and renowned educational partner that empowers youth to achieve their fullest potential as 
agents of change.
Wendy Mesley is a regular contributor to CBC News: The National, CBC Television’s flagship news 
program, appearing throughout the week in a regular segment that asks provocative questions about 
the news stories Canadians are talking about. She also contributes to CBC News: Marketplace, CBC 
Television's award-winning prime-time investigative consumer show. 
Richard Rosenthal was appointed BC’s first Chief Civilian Director of the Independent Investigations 
Office on January 9, 2012. He has extensive experience in civilian oversight of law enforcement 
having served for 15 years as deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, where he worked on 
various assignments.
Ian McPherson is a Partner, Advisory Services with KPMG in Toronto and the former Assistant 
Commissioner of Territorial Policing at the Metropolitan Police Service in London, UK. Ian is with 
KPMG's Global Centre of Excellence for Justice and Security, leading its work throughout North 
America.
Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie is considered the most experienced peacekeeper on the 
planet. MacKenzie has commanded troops from dozens of countries in some of the world's most 
dangerous places. In Sarajevo, during the Bosnian Civil War, he famously managed to open the 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Dr. John Izzo has devoted his life and career to helping leaders create workplaces that bring out the 
best in people, plus discover more purpose and fulfillment in life and work. For over 20 years, he has 
pioneered employee engagement, helping organizations create great corporate cultures and leading 
brands through transformations that create both customer and employee loyalty.
In an increasingly social world, Susan Cain shifts our focus to help us reconsider the role of introverts 
- outlining their many strengths and vital contributions. Like A Whole New Mind and Stumbling on 
Happiness, Cain's book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts In a World That Can't Stop Talking, is a 
paradigm-changing lodestar that shows how dramatically our culture has come to misunderstand and 
undervalue introverts. 
Speakers include
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DROP
On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada rose by two last year. In 2012 
five peace officers lost their lives on 
the job as reported by the Officer 
Down Memorial Page. 
Once again motor vehicles, not guns, posed the 
greatest risk to officers and continue to do so as the 
last 10 years suggest. Since 2003, 25 officers have 
lost their lives in circumstances involving  vehicles, 
including  automobile and motorcycle accidents (18), 
vehicular assault (5), and being  struck by a vehicle 
(2). These deaths account for 45% of all on-duty 
deaths, which is more than twice the next leading 
cause of gunfire (13) in the same 10 year period. On 
average, six officers lost their lives each year during 
the last decade, while 2005 had the most deaths at 
11. 
2012 ROLL OF HONOUR
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2012 Average Tour: 11 years 7 months
2012 Average Age: 30
2012 Deaths by Gender: female - 1
       male - 4
2011 Deaths by Cause:
✴ automobile accident - 3
✴ struck by vehicle - 1
✴ assault - 1
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2012 Deaths by Province:
✴ Alberta - 1
✴ British Columbia - 1
✴ Quebec - 2
✴ Saskatchewan - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 6
✴ male - 49
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed February 1, 2013]
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 4
Assault 1 1 2
Auto accident 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 17
Drowned 1 1 2
Duty related illness 1 1
Gunfire 1 3 3 5 1 13
Heart attack 1 1 2 4
Motorcycle accident 1 1
Natural disaster 2 2
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 1 1 2
Vehicular assault 2 1 1 1 5
Total 5 3 7 4 2 4 6 11 7 6 55
Female 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
Male 4 3 6 3 2 4 5 10 6 6 49
POLICE ASSAULTS
According  to a Statistics Canada report, “Police-
reported crime statistics in Canada, 2011,” 
assaulting  a police officer dropped (-26%) from 
2010 to 2011. In 2011 there were 11,943 assault 
police officer offences compared to 15,913 the 
previous year. However, from 2001 to 2011, 
assaults against police have risen 31%. This increase 
may be attributable to new offences of assault with 
weapon/CBH to a peace officer and aggravated 
assault against peace officer which were recently 
added to the Criminal Code. These offences would 
have previously been reported under the general 
assault with weapon/CBH or aggravated assault 
provisions. For other assaults in 2011, there were 
172,770 reports of common assault (level 1), 
50,184 assaults with a weapon or bodily harm 
(level 2) and 3,486 offences of aggravated assault 
(level 3). 
11%
89%
On-Duty Deaths 2003-2012 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 24, 2011.
Volume 13 Issue 1 - January/February 2013
PAGE 40
U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2012 2011
911 relatd illness 1 6
Aircraft accident 3 1
Animal related - 1
Assault 1 5
Automobile accident 25 36
Drowned - 4
Duty related illness 4 7
Explosion - 1
Fall 2 -
Gunfire 48 67
Gunfire (accidental) 2 5
Heart attack 7 12
Heat exhaustion 1 1
Motorcycle accident 5 5
Stabbed 5 2
Struck by vehicle 6 4
Training accident 2 1
Vehicle pursuit 5 4
Vehicular assault 11 12
Weather/natural disaster - 1
Total 128 175
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2002-2011)
Year 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Total
Deaths 128 175 176 140 153 202 161 165 166 150 1,681
Avg. age 41 41 42 40 40 40 38 39 40 38
Avg. tour 11 yrs.
11 mos.
13 yrs.
4 mos.
12 yrs.
1 mos.
11 yrs.
11 mos.
11 yrs.
10 mos.
11 yrs.
4 mos.
11 yrs.
4 mos.
11 yrs.
1 mos.
12 yrs.
10 mos.
10 yrs.
5 mos.
Female 13 11 9 3 13 9 9 5 9 6 87
Male 115 164 167 137 140 193 152 160 157 144 1529
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS INCREASE
During  2012 the U.S. lost 128 
peace officers, down 47 from 
2011. The top cause of death 
was gunfire (48) followed by 
automobile accidents (25), 
vehicular assault (11) and heart 
attack (7). 
Texas lost the most officers for 
the sixth consecutive year at 11 - followed by the U.S. 
Government (9), Georgia (7), Colorado (6), North Carolina (6), 
F lor ida (5 ) , Louis iana (5 ) , 
Maryland (5), New York (5), 
Pennsylvania (5) and Puerto Rico 
(5).  The average age of deceased 
officers was 41 years while the 
average tour of duty was 11 years 
and 11 months service. Men 
accounted for almost 90% of 
officer deaths while women 
made up 10%. 
Females
10%
Males
90%
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed February 23, 2013]
“It Is Not How These Officers Died That 
Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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REASONABLE GROUNDS: 
OFFICER TRAINING & 
EXPERIENCE COUNT
R. v Phung, 2013 ABCA 63                 
After receiving  two tips that an Asian 
male was engaged in drug  dealing, 
surveillance was set up on the 
accused and a police officer believed 
he saw him engage in a drug  deal. 
He was arrested and, as an incident to that arrest, a 
search followed. Police found a bag  of powder 
cocaine, a bag  of crack cocaine and a cell phone on 
the accused. In his car they located four bags of 
marijuana, four cell phones, bear spray and a large 
kitchen knife. Police also obtained search warrants 
for two residences linked to the accused and 
recovered bags of marijuana, ecstasy pills, cash, 
body armour, weapons, cocaine and weigh scales. 
He was charged with several crimes, including  drug 
and weapons offences. 
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench               
The judge concluded that the police 
officer’s observation by itself was 
insufficient to provide reasonable grounds 
for the arrest. However, in combination 
with the informer tips and the officer’s experience 
the standard had been met. She concluded that the 
officer had the necessary subjective belief and that 
his grounds were objectively reasonable. The arrest 
was lawful and the search incidental to that arrest 
was reasonable. The evidence was admissible and 
the accused was convicted of several offences. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the 
admissibility of the evidence 
against him, arguing  the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to 
arrest him thereby breaching  his s. 9 Charter rights. 
As well, he suggested that the incidental search was 
unreasonable under s. 8. In his view, the evidence 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2).  
Reasonable Grounds
In order for a search incidental to arrest to be 
reasonable the arrest itself must be lawful. Under s. 
495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code an arrest requires 
reasonable grounds. The Alberta Court of Appeal 
noted that the characteristics of reasonable grounds 
is an area of law that has been thoroughly plowed, 
citing a number of points:
• The arresting officer must 
1) subjectively have reasonable grounds to 
make the arrest; and 
2) those grounds must be justifiable from 
an objective point of view.
• The existence of objectively reasonable grounds 
for arrest requires that a Court consider whether 
a reasonable person would find reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest. 
• The reasonable person is “in the shoes” of the 
police officer, and can take into account the 
officer’s training and experience.
• The “reasonable grounds” standard has been 
described as “the point where credibly-based 
probability replaces suspicion” and has been 
characterized in terms of “reasonable 
probability.” 
• Reasonable grounds is a standard higher than a 
reasonable suspicion but less than a prima facie 
case. Reasonable suspicion, by contrast, exists 
where there is “a constellation of objectively 
discernible facts which give the detaining 
officer reasonable cause to suspect that the 
detainee is criminally implicated in the activity 
under investigation.”
• The totality of the circumstances must be 
considered, including  the sufficiency of the 
informer tips, which were more than mere 
rumour or gossip. 
• It is not the roll of an appeal “court to engage 
in precise margin definition regarding  the 
interpretation of physical movements by trained 
police officers.”
“[T]he reasonable person is ‘in the shoes’ of the police officer, and can take into account 
the officer’s training and experience.”
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Here, the police had both informant tips and an 
observed transaction. The Court of Appeal found no 
error in the trial judge’s conclusion that there were 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused. There 
were no ss. 8 or 9 Charter  breaches and no taint 
from the arrest to the content of the Informations to 
Obtain the search warrants for the residences. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER BREACHES INCIDENT TO 
ARREST VALID
R. v. Sesay, 2013 MBCA 8                     
   
A police officer initiated a traffic stop 
on a vehicle driven by the accused 
after seeing  it run through a stop sign. 
He pulled the SUV over in a parking 
lot with the intention of issuing  a 
traffic offence notice. The accused had a passenger 
with him. The officer asked for identification and 
registration and a computer check in the police car 
revealed the accused was flagged as a “known gang 
member,” “armed and dangerous,” a “suspected 
drug  dealer” and had been known to be “violent or 
assaultive.”  The officer called for back-up and two 
additional units with two officers in each arrived, 
parking  in such a fashion as to effectively box in the 
SUV. The accused was given his documents back 
and handed a ticket. The passenger was then asked 
to identify himself. He provided identification and 
the two men were asked to remain in the vehicle. 
The officer returned to the police car and checked 
the passenger on the computer, finding  he was 
currently on bail for drug  trafficking  with conditions, 
including  a requirement that he produce a copy of 
his undertaking  upon police request and not possess 
drugs or electronic communication devices, such as 
cell phones, pagers or Blackberries. The passenger, 
when asked, was unable to produce a copy of his 
undertaking. He was asked to step from the vehicle, 
arrested, searched and read his rights. He was then 
handcuffed and seated on the curb. 
The accused, who was now speaking  to his lawyer 
on his phone, got out of the SUV, locked the doors 
and refused to provide the keys so the police could 
search it. The police wanted to search it for any 
weapons, cell phones or other items prohibited by 
the undertaking  as an incident to the passenger’s 
arrest. The accused eventually relented, produced 
the keys and a search was conducted. Two cell 
phones were found: one on the inside of the 
passenger door and one in the central console 
between the passenger and driver’s seat. Police also 
found a gum container on the slider rail of the 
passenger seat nearest the passenger door. The  gum 
container had 24 individually foil-wrapped packages 
of crack cocaine in it. The accused was arrested, 
given his rights, cautioned and handcuffed. He was 
searched, found to have $320 in cash in his right 
front pocket and was subsequently charged with 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing proceeds of crime under $5,000.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The trial judge concluded that the 
accused was not unlawfully detained. 
She found the traffic stop was lawful and 
the accused was merely delayed because 
of his passenger’s arrest. Furthermore, the officer’s 
stated reasons for searching  the vehicle, including  a 
concern for officer safety, were reasonable in the 
circumstances.   As well, the search was reasonably 
conducted and lawful as an incident to the 
passenger’s arrest. The accused’s arrest, she held, did 
not occur until the discovery of the gum container 
and its contents. His arrest was therefore lawful. 
“I am satisfied both subjectively and objectively that 
[the officer] had reasonable grounds to detain and 
arrest [the accused] when he did, in light of the 
drugs that were found in the car and all the other 
information he had and his detention was not 
arbitrary,” said the judge. “His reasons for doing  so 
were clearly articulated and can easily be inferred 
from all of the circumstances in full conformity with 
the law.” The evidence was admitted and the 
accused was convicted on both charges. He was 
sentenced to three and a half years in prison, less six 
months time served, but consecutive to a two year 
sentence he was currently serving  for another drug 
offence. 
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Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the search incidental 
to the arrest of his passenger was 
unlawful and unreasonable in its 
scope. In his view, the search to protect and discover 
evidence related to the breach of undertaking  was 
unnecessary. The passenger had told the officer he 
did not have his undertaking  with him, which 
provided all the necessary evidence for laying  a 
breach of undertaking  charge. Further, he suggested 
safety was not an issue since the scene was secure, 
he was out of the vehicle and his access to it could 
be restricted. Moreover, the passenger was under 
arrest, removed from the vehicle, placed on the curb 
and searched.
Search Incident to Arrest
Justice Monnin, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, cited a useful summary from British 
Columbia’s top court (R. v. Majedi, 2009 BCCA 276) 
on the principles governing search incident to arrest: 
• Officers undertaking  a search incidental to 
arrest do not require reasonable and probable 
grounds; a lawful arrest provides that 
foundation and the right to search derives from 
it;
• The right to search does not arise out of a 
reduced expectation of privacy of the arrested 
person, but flows out of the need for the 
authorities to gain control of the situation and 
the need to obtain information;
• A legally unauthorized search to make an 
inventory is not a valid search incidental to 
arrest;
• The three main purposes of a search incidental 
to arrest are: one, to ensure the safety of the 
police and the public; two, to protect evidence; 
three, to discover evidence;
• The categories of legitimate purposes are not 
closed: while the police have considerable 
leeway, a valid purpose is required that must be 
“truly incidental” to the arrest;
• If the justification for the search is to find 
evidence, there must be a reasonable prospect 
the evidence will relate to the offence for which 
the person has been arrested;
• The police undertaking  a search incidental to 
arrest subjectively must have a valid purpose in 
mind, the reasonableness of which must be 
considered objectively.
 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal found the vehicle 
search was justified as an incident to arrest for safety 
and evidence reasons, both legitimate purposes for 
exercising  this search power. Although officer safety 
may not have been the primary reason for the search 
of the vehicle after the passenger’s arrest, it was a 
relevant factor. “The fact that he was operating  under 
the premise that he had been warned that the 
accused was a gang  member, armed and dangerous 
and known for violent and aggressive behaviour, are 
all factors which would support, in an objective 
fashion, a decision to embark on a further search of 
the vehicle to look for prohibited weapons and 
ensure his security as well as that of the other 
officers,” said Justice Monnin. “That it was not a 
primary factor does not take away that it was one 
aspect of his reasons for performing the search.” 
As well, the passenger was arrested for breach of 
undertaking, an undertaking  that had different facets. 
Since the passenger did not have his undertaking 
with him it was open to the officer “to seek further 
evidence of a breach of the same undertaking.” It 
was not outside the scope of searching  as an 
incident to arrest for a breach of one of the 
undertakings condition to search the vehicle for 
evidence with respect to a possible breaches of 
other conditions arising from the same undertaking.
The search incidental to arrest was made for valid 
reasons and was performed reasonably.  It was 
therefore lawful and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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